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Abstract
Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world
security applications. These applications are based on different but related game-
theoretical models collectively known as security games. Much of the research in this
area has focused on the two-player setting in which the first player (leader, defender)
commits to a strategy, after which the second player (follower, attacker) observes
that strategy and responds to it. This is commonly known as the Stackelberg, or
leader-follower, model. In contrast, if none of the players can observe the actions
of the others then such a setting is called a simultaneous-move game. A common
solution concept in simultaneous-move games is that of Nash equilibrium (NE). In
the present dissertation, we contribute to this line of research in two ways.
First, we consider new ways of modeling commitment. We propose a new model
in which the leader can commit to a correlated strategy. We show that this model
is equivalent to the Stackelberg model in two-player games and is different from the
existing models in games with three or more players. We propose an algorithm for
computing a solution in this model in polynomial time. We also consider a leader-
follower setting in which the players are uncertain about whether the follower can
observe the leader’s strategy. We describe an iterative algorithm for solving such
games.
Second, we analyze the computational complexity of computing Stackelberg and
NE strategies in security games. We describe algorithms to solve some variants of
iv
a previously proposed model of security games in polynomial time and prove NP-
hardness of solving other variants of the model. We also extend the family of security
games by allowing the attacker to have multiple resources. We provide an algorithm
for computing an NE of such games in polynomial time, and we show that computing
a Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard.
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General game-theoretic notation
The symbols in the following list are used to describe the various games throughout
the thesis.
Ai The set of actions of player i. We will denote the individual
actions by, for example, ai, a
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i P Ai.
Si The set of mixed strategies of player i. Each si P Si is a distri-
bution over Ai.
ui The utility function of player i. For example, in two-player
games, player i’s utility for the outcome pa1, a2q is uipa1, a2q.
uips1, s2q The expected utility of player i when the players play the mixed
strategies s1, s2.
Security games notation
The symbols in the following list are used to describe the security games models in
Chapters 4 and 5.
T The set of targets. We will usually refer to the individual targets
using symbols such as t, t1, t1, t2.
Ω The set of resources.
Σ The set of schedules. Each schedule σ P Σ is a subset of targets
T .
H When the resources are heterogeneous, we denote the subset of
schedules to which resource ω can be assigned by Hpωq.
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cω,σ The probability that resource ω is assigned to schedule σ.
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1Introduction
When multiple self-interested agents interact in the same domain, game theory pro-
vides a framework for reasoning about how each agent should act. One use of game
theory is by an outside party that tries to predict the outcome of a strategic sit-
uation. For example, when we design a mechanism (e.g., an auction), we can use
game theory to evaluate whether any given design will lead to good outcomes when
the agents participating in it are strategic. Another use is by one of the agents in
the game that wants to determine how to play. For example, game theory is often
used to create poker-playing programs (Sandholm, 2010). Recently, algorithms for
computing game-theoretic solutions have also started to find applications in secu-
rity applications, where one of the players, the defender, tries to allocate limited
defensive resources in anticipation of an attack by an attacker. Real-world examples
include the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los Angeles International
airport (Pita et al., 2009), the assignment of Federal Air Marshals to flights (Tsai
et al., 2009), scheduling of Coast Guard patrols (An et al., 2013), and scheduling
patrols of the Los Angeles Metro rail to deter fare evasion (Jiang et al., 2013).
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1.1 Nash Equilibrium
Probably the best-known solution concept in game theory is that of Nash equilib-
rium (NE, Nash 1950). Before giving a formal definition, we will first show a Nash
equilibrium of the example game in Figure 1.1 and introduce some of the notation
that we will use throughout this thesis.
L R
U (1,1) (3,0)
D (0,0) (2,1)
Figure 1.1: An example 2 2 normal-form game.
There are two players in this game. The row player’s set of actions (or pure
strategies) is A1  tU,Du. The column player’s set of actions is A2  tL,Ru.
Depending on the players’ choice of actions, there are four possible outcomes of the
game, each specified by a pair of actions pa1, a2q. The table representation shown in
Figure 1.1 is called the normal form of the game. In the normal form, the utilities for
each outcome are specified by an entry in the matrix. In this example, if the outcome
of the game is pa1  U, a2  Rq, then the row player gets a utility of u1pU,Rq  3,
and the column player gets u2pU,Rq  0.
Any game with a finite number of pure strategies for each player has a normal
form representation. In this thesis, we will use the normal form as well as other game
representations.
If the two players in the example are rational, we can compute the unique Nash
equilibrium using iterated strict dominance as follows. First, note that the row player
gets a higher utility from playing U than she would get from playing D no matter
which action the column player chooses. We say that the action U dominates the
action D for the row player, and we can thus remove the action D from the game.
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Once the D row is removed from the game, the L action dominates the R action
for the column player, and we can remove the R column from the game. The only
outcome left, pU,Lq, is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of actions, one for each player,
such that no player can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her action.
Not every game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, every normal-form
game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (Nash, 1950). A mixed strategy is a
probability distribution over a player’s action set. A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
is a profile of mixed strategies such that no player can increase her expected utility
by unilaterally changing her mixed strategy. In this thesis, when we talk about
a strategy, we will usually mean a mixed strategy, and when we talk about a Nash
equilibrium, we will mean a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, unless otherwise noted.
How can the players achieve a Nash equilibrium in a game? If the equilibrium is
unique, then each player can compute the equilibrium profile and play her strategy in
that profile. In some games with multiple equilibria, the players can always achieve
an equilibrium by each computing an arbitrary equilibrium profile and playing her
part of that profile, even if the players do not coordinate on the same equilibrium.
This property is called the interchange property. If the interchange property does
not hold, the players may not be able to achieve an equilibrium without using extra
communication: if they compute different equilibria, the result may not be an NE.
In such games, the players face the equilibrium selection problem.
Computing a Nash equilibrium of a normal-form game is PPAD-complete
(Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009), and computing an (even approximately)
optimal Nash equilibrium is NP-hard for just about any reasonable definition of
optimality (Gilboa and Zemel, 1989; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2008).
Even though there is no known polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash
equilibrium of normal-form games, it may still be possible to find a polynomial-time
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algorithm for computing an NE of games which have a special structure in the utility
function. On the other hand, for games which have more concise representations
than the normal form, it may be possible to prove NP-hardness in the size of the
concise representation, even when just computing any one equilibrium. We will
consider several games with concise representations (in Chapters 4 and 5) and provide
polynomial-time algorithms for computing an NE of some of those games and prove
NP-hardness of computing an NE in other games. We will also prove the interchange
property in certain games. But before we get to that, we will discuss another solution
concept, the (mixed) Stackelberg strategy, and the relationship between the NE and
the Stackelberg strategy.
1.2 The Stackelberg Model
Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept in game theory. An alternative
solution concept (for two-player games) is the following. Suppose that player one (the
leader) is able to commit to a mixed strategy; then, player two (the follower) observes
this commitment, and chooses a response. Such a commitment model is known as
a Stackelberg model (von Stackelberg, 1934), and we will refer to an optimal mixed
strategy for player one to commit to as an (optimal) Stackelberg strategy.
It has long been well known in game theory that being able to commit to a
course of action before the other player(s) move(s)—often referred to as a Stackelberg
model (von Stackelberg, 1934)—can bestow significant advantages. Consider again
the example game in Figure 1.1. If player 1 can commit to a pure strategy before
player 2 moves, then player 1 is better off committing to D, thereby incentivizing
player 2 to play R, resulting in a utility of 2 for player 1. Even better for player 1 is to
commit to a mixed strategy of p.49U, .51Dq; this still incentivizes player 2 to play R
and results in an expected utility of .49 3  .51 2  2.49 for player 1. Of course, it is
even better to commit to p.499U, .501Dq, etc. In the limit case of p.5U, .5Dq, player
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2 becomes indifferent between L and R; to guarantee the existence of an optimal
solution, it is generally assumed that player 2 breaks ties in player 1’s favor, so that
p.5U, .5Dq is the unique optimal mixed strategy for player 1 to commit to, resulting
in an expected utility of 2.5 for her. In two-player zero-sum games, Nash equilibrium
strategies and Stackelberg strategies both coincide with minimax strategies (and,
hence, with each other), due to von Neumann’s minimax theorem (von Neumann,
1928).
In recent years, the problem of computing an optimal strategy to commit to in
non-zero-sum games has started to receive a significant amount of attention, es-
pecially in the multiagent systems community. In the initial paper (Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2006), a number of variants were studied, including commitment to pure
and to mixed strategies, in normal-form and in Bayesian games. There have been
several other papers making progress on versions of the problem that concern stan-
dard game-theoretic representations, including Bayesian games (Paruchuri et al.,
2008; Letchford et al., 2009; Jain et al., 2011), extensive-form games (Letchford and
Conitzer, 2010), and stochastic games (Letchford et al., 2012). Perhaps the biggest
impulse to this line of research is due to the use of these techniques in several security
applications, which we mentioned earlier in this chapter. These developments have
inspired work on computing optimal mixed strategies to commit to in a specific class
of games called security games (Kiekintveld et al., 2009; Korzhyk et al., 2010).
We will first describe the standard algorithm for computing a Stackelberg strategy
in a normal-form game. We will use some of the ideas from this algorithm to design
new algorithms in this thesis.
1.3 The Multiple-LPs Approach to Computing a Stackelberg Strategy
For a two-player normal-form game (not necessarily zero-sum), the optimal Stack-
elberg strategy can be found in polynomial time, using a set of linear programs
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(LP) (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel and Zamir, 2010).1 Besides this
computational benefit over Nash equilibrium, with Stackelberg strategies there is
effectively no equilibrium selection problem.
We now describe the standard approach to computing an optimal mixed strategy
to commit to with two players. The idea is a very natural divide-and-conquer ap-
proach: because we can assume without loss of optimality that in the solution, player
2 will play a pure strategy, we can simply consider each pure strategy for player 2 in
turn. Let player i’s set of pure strategies be Ai. For each pure strategy a2 P A2 for
player 2, we solve for the optimal mixed strategy for player 1, under the constraint
that a2 is a best response for player 2.
Linear Program 1 (known).
max
°
a1PA1
pa1u1pa1, a2q
subject to:
p@a12 P A2q
°
a1PA1
pa1u2pa1, a
1
2q ¤
°
a1PA1
pa1u2pa1, a2q
°
a1PA1
pa1  1
p@a1 P A1q pa1 ¥ 0
(The first constraint says that player 2 should not be better off playing a12 instead of
a2.) There is one of these linear programs for every a2, and at least one of these must
have a feasible solution. We choose one with the highest optimal solution value; an
optimal solution to this linear program corresponds to an optimal mixed strategy to
commit to. Because linear programs can be solved in polynomial time, this gives a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal mixed strategy to commit to.
1 It is not known whether linear programs are solvable in strongly polynomial time, that is, with
no dependence on the sizes of the input numbers at all. Consequently, it is not known whether any
of the problems for which we propose LP-based solutions in this thesis can be solved in strongly
polynomial time.
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We will now discuss several computational and modeling issues with the Stackel-
berg model and briefly describe how we address those issues in this thesis.
It is not clear how best to extend the Stackelberg model to games with three or
more players. Should there be a single leader who commits to a strategy and lets the
other players play a Nash equilibrium in the resulting subgame? In such a model, the
remaining players would face the equilibrium selection problem, and they would not
have a polynomial-time algorithm to compute their strategies. Should we then let all
the players commit in sequence? In that case, it may be not clear how to choose the
right sequence of players, especially if the number of players is large. In Chapter 2,
we propose another model, in which a single leader chooses a correlated strategy to
commit to. We will show that our proposed model coincides with the Stackelberg
model for games with two players and can be naturally extended to games with three
or more players. We also provide an algorithm for solving our model in polynomial
time.
In some practical applications, the players may be uncertain about whether the
follower can indeed observe the leader’s actions. Neither the Nash nor the Stackel-
berg model can be directly applied to such games. In Chapter 3, we consider one
way of modeling such uncertainty about observability. We design an algorithm for
computing an equilibrium of that model and provide experimental analysis of its run
time.
When a game has a concise representation such that the size of its normal form
is exponential in the size of the concise representation, the multiple-LPs approach
described above is inefficient. We will consider several such games in Chapters 4 and
5. We will provide polynomial-time algorithms for computing a Stackelberg strategy
in some of those games and prove that it is NP-hard to do in others.
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1.4 The Dissertation Structure
In Chapter 2, we propose a new solution concept in which one of the players chooses a
correlated strategy to commit to. We show the relationship between this new concept
and Stackelberg strategies, and provide an algorithm for efficient computation of an
optimal correlated strategy to commit to. In Chapter 3, we consider a game model in
which the players are uncertain about whether the follower can observe the leader’s
strategy. We provide an algorithm for computing an NE in this extended game model
and demonstrate practical limitations of such a model. In Chapter 4, we shift our
attention to a class of games between a defender and an attacker known as security
games (Kiekintveld et al., 2009). In security games, the defender first allocates
resources to protect a set of targets, after which the attacker chooses a single target
to attack. We discuss why the known techniques for solving normal-form games
are inefficient when applied to security games and provide algorithms for efficiently
solving security games. Finally, in Chapter 5, we expand the security games model
by allowing simultaneous attacks. We discuss potential practical applications of the
proposed model, provide an algorithm for computing an NE of the expanded game,
and prove that computing a Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard.
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2Commitment to Correlated Strategies
In the introduction, we showed that in a two-player normal-form game, the optimal
mixed strategy to commit to can be found in polynomial time, by solving multiple
linear programs. Still, given the problem’s fundamental nature and importance, it
seems worthwhile to investigate it in more detail. Can we design other, possibly more
efficient algorithms? Can we relate this problem to other computational problems in
game theory?
With three or more players, it is not immediately clear how to define the optimal
mixed strategy to commit to for player 1. The reason is that, after player 1’s commit-
ment, the remaining players play a game among themselves, and we need to consider
according to which solution concept they will play. For example, to be consistent
with the tie-breaking assumption in the two-player case, we could assume that the
remaining players will play according to the Nash equilibrium of the remaining game
that is best for player 1. However, this optimization problem is already NP-hard by
itself, and in fact inapproximable unless P=NP (Gilboa and Zemel, 1989; Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2008), so there is little hope that this approach will lead to an ef-
ficient algorithm. Is there another natural solution concept that allows for a more
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efficient solution with three or more players?
In this chapter, we make progress on these questions as follows. First, we show
how to formulate the problem in the two-player setting as a single linear program,1
and prove the correctness of this formulation by relating it to the existing multiple-
LPs formulation. We then show how this single LP can be interpreted as a formu-
lation for finding the optimal correlated strategy to commit to, giving an easy proof
of a known result by von Stengel and Zamir (2010) that the optimal mixed strategy
to commit to results in a utility for the leader that is at least as good as what she
would obtain in any correlated equilibrium. We then show how this formulation can
be extended to compute an optimal correlated strategy to commit to with three or
more players, and illustrate by example that this can result in a higher utility for
player 1 both compared to the best mixed strategy to commit to as well as com-
pared to the best correlated equilibrium for player 1. (Unlike in two-player games, in
games of three or more players, the notions of optimal mixed and correlated strate-
gies to commit to are truly distinct.) Finally, we present experiments that indicate
that, for 50 50 games drawn from “most” distribution families, our formulation is
significantly faster than the multiple-LPs approach. We also investigate how often
the correlated strategy is a product distribution (so that correlation does not play a
role); as expected, with two players we always have a product distribution, but with
more players this depends extremely strongly on the distribution over games that is
used.
1 Earlier work has already produced formulations of ((pre-)Bayesian versions of) the problem that
involve only a single optimization (Paruchuri et al. 2008, extended version of Letchford, Conitzer,
and Munagala 2009). However, these existing formulations use integer variables (even when re-
stricted to the case of a single follower type).
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2.1 Review: Correlated Equilibrium and the LP to Compute It
In a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974), a third party known as a mediator draws
an outcome pa1, a2q, recommends to each player i to play ai without telling what the
recommendation to the other player is, and it is optimal for each player to follow the
recommendation. Every Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium. We can
describe the set of all correlated equilibria of a normal-form game with a set of linear
constraints. Consider the following linear feasibility formulation of the correlated
equilibrium problem.
Linear Program 2 (known).
(no objective required)
subject to:
p@a1, a
1
1 P A1q
°
a2PA2
ppa1,a2qu1pa
1
1, a2q ¤
°
a2PA2
ppa1,a2qu1pa1, a2q
p@a2, a
1
2 P A2q
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a
1
2q ¤
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a2q
°
a1PA1,a2PA2
ppa1,a2q  1
p@a1 P A1, a2 P A2q ppa1,a2q ¥ 0
The variables ppa1,a2q are the probabilities that the mediator puts on each out-
come. The first set of constraints are the optimality constraints for player 1: for any
recommendation that player 1 may receive, following that recommendation must give
player 1 an expected utility at least as high as the expected utility from taking any
other action. The second set of constraints similarly describes optimality for player
2.
In the next section, we will show how a similar LP can be used to compute a
Stackelberg strategy.
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2.2 A Single LP to Compute a Stackelberg Strategy
Instead of solving one separate linear program per pure strategy for player 2 as in
the multiple-LPs approach, we can solve the following single linear program:
Linear Program 3.
max
°
a1PA1,a2PA2
ppa1,a2qu1pa1, a2q
subject to:
p@a2, a
1
2 P A2q
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a
1
2q ¤
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a2q
°
a1PA1,a2PA2
ppa1,a2q  1
p@a1 P A1, a2 P A2q ppa1,a2q ¥ 0
We now explain why this linear program computes a Stackelberg strategy. The
constraint matrix for Linear Program 3 has blocks along the diagonal: for each
a2 P A2, there is a set of constraints (one constraint for every a
1
2 P A2) whose
only nonzero coefficients correspond to the variables ppa1,a2q (one variable for every
a1 P A1). The exception is the probability constraint which has nonzero coefficients
for all variables (cf. Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, Dantzig and Wolfe 1960.) The
following proposition will help us to understand the relationship to the multiple-LPs
approach, and hence the correctness of Linear Program 3.
Proposition 1. Linear Program 3 always has an optimal solution in which only
a single block of variables takes nonzero values. That is, there exists an optimal
solution for which there is some a2 P A2 such that for any a1 P A1, a2 P A2 where
a2  a

2 , ppa1,a2q  0.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that all optimal solutions require nonzero
values for at least k blocks, where k ¥ 2. For an optimal solution p with exactly
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k nonzero blocks, let a2, a
1
2 P A2, a2  a
1
2 be such that ta2 
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2q ¡
0 and ta12 
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a12q ¡ 0. Let va2 
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu1pa1, a2q and va12 °
a1PA1
ppa1,a12qu1pa1, a
1
2q. Without loss of generality, suppose that va2{ta2 ¥ va12{ta12 .
Then consider the following modified solution p1:
• for all a1 P A1, p1pa1,a2q 
ta2 ta12
ta2
ppa1,a2q;
• for all a1 P A1, p1pa1,a12q  0;
• for all a22 R ta2, a12u, p1pa1,a22q  ppa1,a22q.
p1 has k  1 blocks with nonzero values; we will show that p1 remains feasible and
has at least the same objective value as p, and must therefore be optimal, so that we
arrive at the desired contradiction.
To prove that p1 is still feasible, we first notice that any of the constraints cor-
responding to the unchanged blocks (for a22 R ta2, a
1
2u) must still hold because none
of the variables with nonzero coefficients in these constraints have changed value.
The constraints for the block corresponding to a12 hold trivially because all the
variables with nonzero coefficients are set to zero. The constraints for the block
corresponding to a2 still hold because all the variables with nonzero coefficients
have been multiplied by the same constant
ta2 ta12
ta2
. Finally, the probability con-
straint still holds because the total probability on the variables in the a2 block is
°
a1PA1
p1pa1,a2q 
°
a1PA1
ta2 ta12
ta2
ppa1,a2q 
ta2 ta12
ta2
ta2  ta2   ta12 , that is, we have sim-
ply shifted the probability mass from a12 to a2. (All the probabilities are also still
nonnegative, because
ta2 ta12
ta2
is positive.)
To prove that p1 is no worse than p, we note that the total objective value derived
under p1 from variables in the a2 block of variables is
°
a1PA1
p1pa1,a2qu1pa1, a2q 
°
a1PA1
ta2 ta12
ta2
ppa1,a2qu1pa1, a2q 
ta2 ta12
ta2
va2 ¥ va2   va12 , where the inequality follows
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from va2{ta2 ¥ va12{ta12 . On the other hand, the total objective value derived under
p1 from variables in the a12 block of variables is 0 because all these variables are set
to zero. In contrast, under the solution p, the total objective value from these two
blocks is va2   va12 . Because p and p
1 agree on the other blocks, it follows that p1
obtains at least as large an objective value as p, and we have a contradiction.
Proposition 1 suggests that one approach to solving Linear Program 3 is to force
all the variables to zero with the exception of a single block and solve the remaining
linear program; we try this for every block, and take the optimal solution overall.
However, this approach coincides exactly with the original multiple-LPs approach,
because:
Observation 1. In Linear Program 3, if for some a2, we force all the variables
ppa1,a12q for which a
1
2  a2 to zero, then the linear program that remains is identical
to Linear Program 1.
This also proves the correctness of Linear Program 3 (because the multiple-LPs
approach is correct).
2.3 Game-theoretic Interpretation: Commitment to Correlated Strate-
gies
Linear Program 3 can be interpreted as follows. Player 1 commits to a correlated
strategy. This entails that player 1 chooses a distribution ppa1,a2q over the outcomes,
and commits to acting as follows: she draws pa1, a2q according to the distribution,
recommends to player 2 that he should play a2, and plays a1 herself. The constraints
p@a2, a
1
2 P A2q°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a
1
2q ¤
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2qu2pa1, a2q
in Linear Program 2 then mean that player 2 should always follow the recommenda-
tion a2 rather than take some alternative action a
1
2. This is for the following reasons:
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if for some a2,
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2q  0, then there will never be a recommendation to
player 2 to play a2, and indeed the constraint will hold trivially in this case. On the
other hand, if
°
a1PA1
ppa1,a2q ¡ 0, then player 2’s subjective probability that player 1
will play a1 given a recommendation of a2 is P pa1|a2q 
ppa1,a2q°
a11PA1
ppa11,a2q
. Hence player 2
will be incentivized to follow the recommendation of playing a2 rather than a
1
2 if and
only if p@a2, a
1
2 P A2q
°
a1PA1
P pa1|a2qu2pa1, a
1
2q ¤
°
a1PA1
P pa1|a2qu2pa1, a2q which is
identical to the constraint in Linear Program 3 (by multiplying by
°
a11PA1
ppa11,a2q).
Proposition 1 entails that we can without loss of optimality restrict attention to
solutions where the recommendation to player 2 is always the same (so that there is
no information in the signal to player 2).
Given this interpretation of Linear Program 3, it is not surprising that it is very
similar to the linear feasibility formulation of the correlated equilibrium problem for
two players.
Linear Program 3 is identical to Linear Program 2, except that in Linear Program
3 we have dropped the incentive constraints for player 1, and added an objective of
maximizing player 1’s expected utility. If we add the incentive constraints for player
1 back in, then we obtain a linear program for finding the correlated equilibrium
that maximizes player 1’s utility. Because adding constraints cannot increase the
objective value of a maximization problem, we immediately obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 1 (von Stengel and Zamir 2010). Player 1’s expected utility from optimally
committing to a mixed strategy is at least as high as her utility in any correlated
equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game.
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2.4 Commitment to Correlated Strategies with More Players
We have already seen that committing to a correlated strategy in a two-player game
is in some sense not particularly interesting, because without loss of optimality player
2 will always get the same recommendation from player 1. However, the same is not
true for games with n ¥ 3 players, where player 1 commits to a correlated strategy
and sends recommendations to players 2, . . . , n, who then play simultaneously. We
can easily extend Linear Program 3 to this case of n players (just as it is well known
that Linear Program 2 can be extended to the case of n players):
Linear program 4.
max
°
a1PA1,...,snPSn
ppa1,...,snqu1pa1, . . . , snq
subject to:
p@i P t2, . . . , nuq p@si, s
1
i P Siq
¸
siPSi
ppsi,siquips
1
i, siq ¤
¸
siPSi
ppsi,siquipsi, siq
°
a1PA1,...,snPSn
ppa1,...,snq  1
p@a1 P A1, . . . , sn P Snq ppa1,...,snq ¥ 0
(Here, we followed the standard game theory notation of using i to refer to the
players other than i.) Again, Linear Program 4 is simply the standard linear feasi-
bility program for correlated equilibrium, with the constraints for player 1 omitted
and with an objective of maximizing player 1’s expected utility. This immediately
implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The optimal correlated strategy to commit to in an n-player normal-
form game can be found in time polynomial in the size of the input.
The following example illustrates that if there are three or more players, then com-
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mitment to a correlated strategy can be strictly better for player 1 than commitment
to a mixed strategy (as well as any correlated equilibrium of the simultaneous-move
version of the game).
Example 1. Consider a three-player game between a wildlife refuge Manager (player
1, aka. M), a Lion (player 2, aka. L), and a wildlife Photographer (player 3, aka. P).
There are four locations in the game: A and B (two locations in the refuge that are out
in the open), C (a safe hiding place for the lion), and D (the wildlife photographer’s
home). Each player must choose a location: M can choose between A and B, L
between A, B, and C, and P between A, B, and D.
M wants L to come out into the open, and would prefer even more to be in the
same place as L in order to study him. Specifically, M gets utility 2 if she is in the
same location as L, 1 if L is at A or B but not at the same location as M, and 0
otherwise. L just wants to avoid contact with humans. Specifically, L gets utility
1 unless he is in the same location as another player, in which case he gets 0. P
wants to get a close-up shot of L, but would rather stay home than go out and be
unsuccessful. Specifically, P gets utility 2 for being in the same location as L, and
otherwise 1 for being at D, and 0 otherwise.
A correlated strategy specifies a probability for every outcome, that is, every feasi-
ble triplet of locations for the players. We will show that the unique optimal correlated
strategy for M to commit to is: ppA,B,Dq  1{2, ppB,A,Dq  1{2. That is, she flips a
coin to determine whether to go to A or B, signals to L to go to the other location
of the two, and always signals to P to stay home at D. This is not a correlated
equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game, because M would be better off going to
the same location as L. This does not pose a problem because M is committing to
the strategy. The other two players are best-responding by following the recommen-
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dations: L is getting his maximum possible utility of 1; P (whose signal is always
D and thus carries no information) is getting 1 for staying home, and switching to
either A or B would still leave her with an expected utility of 1.
To see that M cannot do better, note that L can guarantee himself a utility of 1
by always choosing C, so there is no feasible solution where L has positive probability
of being in the same location as another player. Hence, in any feasible solution,
any outcome where M gets utility 2 has zero probability. All that remains to show is
that there is no other feasible solution in which M always gets utility 1. In any such
solution, L must always choose A or B. Also, in any feasible solution, P cannot play
A or B with positive probability, because she can never be in the same location as
L; hence, if she played A or B with positive probability, she would end up with an
expected utility strictly below 1, whereas she can guarantee herself 1 just by choosing
D. Because M also cannot be in the same location as L with positive probability, it
follows that only ppA,B,Dq and ppB,A,Dq can be set to positive values. If one of them
is set to a value greater than 1{2, then P would be better off choosing the location
where L is more than half the time. It follows that ppA,B,Dq  1{2, ppB,A,Dq  1{2 is
the unique optimal solution.
2.5 Experiments
While Linear Programs 3 and 4 are valuable from the viewpoint of improving our
conceptual understanding of commitment, it is also worthwhile to investigate them
as an algorithmic contribution. Linear Program 4 allows us to do something we
could not do before, namely, to compute an optimal correlated strategy to commit
to in games with more than two players. This cannot be said about the special case
of Linear Program 3, because we already had the multiple-LPs approach. But how
does Linear Program 3 compare to the multiple-LPs approach? At least, it provides
a slight implementation advantage, in the sense of not having to write code to iterate
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through multiple LPs. More interestingly, what is the effect on runtime of using it
rather than the multiple-LPs approach? Of course, this depends on the LP solver.
Does the solver benefit from having the problem decomposed into multiple LPs? Or
does it benefit from seeing the whole problem at once?
To answer these questions, we evaluated our approach on GAMUT (Nudelman
et al., 2004), which generates games according to a variety of distributions. Focusing
on two-player games, we used CPLEX 10.010 both for the multiple-LPs approach
(LP1) and for Linear Program 3 (LP3). For each GAMUT game class, we generated
50 two-player games with 50 strategies per player and compared the time it takes to
find the optimal strategies to commit to in these games using LP1 and LP3. We show
the boxplots of the run times in Figure 2.1. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that
LP3 generally solves much faster. One possible explanation for this is as follows.
In the multiple-LPs approach, each block is solved to optimality separately. In
contrast, when presented with LP3, the solver sees the entire problem instance all at
once, which in principle could allow it to quickly prune some blocks as being clearly
suboptimal. The only distribution for which LP3 is slower is RandomZeroSum.
Unfortunately, preliminary experiments on random games indicate that LP3 does
not scale gracefully to larger games, and that perhaps LP1 scales a little better. We
conjecture that this is due to heavier memory requirements for LP3.
Table 2.1 shows how often the correlated strategy to commit to computed by
Linear Program 4 is a product distribution. We say that a distribution ppa1, . . . , snq
is a product distribution iff it satisfies the following condition.
@i P t1, . . . , nu
@ai P ta
2
i P Ai : ppa
2
i q ¡ 0u
@a1i P ta
2
i P Ai : ppa
2
i q ¡ 0u
@si P Si : ppsi|aiq  ppsi|a
1
iq
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Figure 2.1: Run time comparison of LP1 and LP3 on GAMUT games (seconds).
Low percentages here indicate that correlation plays a significant role. To compute
this data, we generated 50 payoff matrices with 10 strategies per player for each
combination of a GAMUT class and a number of players. In other words, if the
leader commits to a product distribution over the strategy profiles, then the recom-
mendation each of the followers gets from the correlated strategy does not give out
any information about the recommendations that the other players receive. In games
with two players, the correlated strategy computed by LP3 is always a product dis-
tribution, as expected by Proposition 1. For games with more than two players, in
some distributions correlation does not play a big role, and in others it does.
We say that a correlated strategy is a degenerate distribution if its support size
is 1. A degenerate distribution is a special case of a product distribution. As we can
see from Table 2.1, a large fraction of computed product distributions are actually
degenerate.
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Table 2.1: For each game class and number of players, the two numbers shown are the
fractions of product distributions (P) and the fractions of degenerate distributions
(D) among the correlated strategies computed by LP4.
Game class \7 players 2 3 4
p d p d p d
BidirectionalLEG 1 .96 .9 .86 .84 .84
CovariantGame 1 .48 .64 .6 .68 .68
DispersionGame 1 1 1 1 1 1
GuessTwoThirdsAve 1 1 0 0 0 0
MajorityVoting 1 .88 1 1 1 1
MinimumEffortGame 1 1 1 1 1 1
RandomGame 1 .42 .16 .08 .02 .02
RandomGraphicalGame 1 .4 .22 .1 .02 .02
RandomLEG 1 1 .92 .92 .02 .02
TravelersDilemma 1 0 1 1 .02 .02
UniformLEG 1 .96 .88 .86 .02 .02
In the next chapter, we will consider another extension of the leader-follower
model. We will consider the case in which the players are uncertain about whether
the follower can observe the leader’s strategy.
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3Solving Stackelberg Games with Uncertain
Observability
Playing a Stackelberg strategy seems to make little sense without some argument as
to why the player should indeed be able to commit before her opponent moves. In
the real-world security applications mentioned in the introduction, where Stackelberg
strategies are indeed used, the argument is that the attacker (follower) can observe
the defender (leader)’s actions over time, and thereby reconstruct the distribution,
before attacking. This argument is not entirely uncontroversial: in many contexts,
it is not clear that the follower can indeed observe the leader’s mixed strategy. A
recent study shows that a large class of security games has the property that any
Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy, and moreover that there is
no equilibrium selection problem (Korzhyk et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this is known
to not be true for other types of security games.
How should the leader agent play when she is not sure about the follower’s ability
to observe her mixed strategy, as is often the case in practice? One model that
has been proposed in the paper by Korzhyk et al. (2011) for this is to consider
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an extensive-form game where Nature makes a random move determining whether
the leader’s mixed strategy is observable or not, and then to find an equilibrium
of this larger game. We will discuss this model in detail in Section 3.1. In this
chapter, we study properties of this model, present the first algorithm for solving
these infinite-size extensive-form games, and evaluate it on random games. Our
algorithm calls subroutines for solving Nash and Stackelberg problems; it works for
any game representation (as long as the Nash and Stackelberg subroutines do).
3.1 Review: Extensive-Form Game to Model Uncertainty about Ob-
servability
There are two players in the original game (represented in normal form): the leader
and the follower. The leader’s set of pure actions is Al. The follower’s set of pure
actions is Af . If the outcome of the game is pal, af q, where al P Al is the leader’s
action and af P Af is the follower’s action, then the leader’s utility is ulpal, af q, and
the follower’s utility is uf pal, af q.
We now present the extensive-form game model introduced in the paper by Ko-
rzhyk et al. (2011) which is arguably the most straightforward way to introduce
uncertainty about the follower’s ability to observe the leader’s distribution over Al.
Let us first explain what is the extensive form. We have seen the normal-form
representation of games in the introduction. The extensive form is a more expressive
representation which can be used to describe general games. Each player is repre-
sented by one or more nodes at which the player can choose her actions. The actions
correspond to the edges connected to the player’s nodes. The sequence in which the
players choose their actions is specified by the path which starts at the root and
follows along the edges corresponding to the actions chosen by the players until a
leaf is reached. If several nodes of a player are in the same information set, then the
player cannot distinguish between those nodes. Some of the nodes may belong to
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Nature, which chooses its actions at random.
The extensive-form game with uncertainty about observability shown in Fig-
ure 3.1 proceeds as follows. First, Nature decides whether the follower will ob-
serve the leader’s distribution or not. The probability that the follower observes
the leader’s distribution is pobs; correspondingly, the probability that the follower
does not observe it is 1  pobs. Then, the leader, without knowing Nature’s choice,
chooses a distribution over Al. (Note that there are infinitely many distributions to
choose from—in particular, choosing a distribution is not the same as randomizing
over which action to choose here.) Next, the follower chooses a response af P Af ,
possibly after observing the distribution over Al chosen by the leader if Nature has
decided that the follower is able to observe.
(pobs) (1-pobs)
Nature
Leader
Follower
 (infinitenumber of  actions)
 (infinitenumber of  actions)
observed not observed
follower moves with knowledge   of the leader's distribution follower moves without knowledge   of the leader's distribution
Figure 3.1: The extensive form of the game.
Nodes that are in the same information set are connected with dashed lines.
The two leader nodes are in the same information set because the leader does not
observe Nature’s decision. The follower’s nodes in the right subtree are in the same
information set, because the right subtree corresponds to the case where the follower
does not observe the distribution.
It is important to emphasize that a pure strategy for the leader in this extensive-
form game is a distribution over Al; a mixed strategy for the leader is a distribution
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over such distributions. (In fact, we will show shortly that a distribution over dis-
tributions over Al cannot be simplified to a distribution over Al in this context.) A
pure strategy for the follower specifies one action in Af for every follower node on the
left-hand side of the tree, plus one additional action for the follower’s information
set on the right-hand side of the tree. In fact, it is possible to simplify the left-hand
side of the tree: we can take the follower’s best action at each of his nodes on the
left-hand side, and simply propagate the corresponding value up to that node as in
backward induction.1 (If there is a tie for the follower, he will break it in favor of
the leader, to stay consistent with the Stackelberg model.) Thus we can eliminate
the bottom level of the left-hand side of the tree, so that effectively a follower pure
strategy in the extensive form consists of only a single action in Af , corresponding
to his action in the information set on the right-hand side.
Since our goal is to solve an extensive-form game, a natural question is whether
off-the-shelf extensive-form game solvers are sufficient for this. As we have pointed
out, the leader’s strategy space is infinite, preventing the direct application of stan-
dard methods. One way to address this is to discretize the leader’s strategy space and
obtain an approximate solution. Because this strategy space is an p|Al|1q-simplex,
discretizing it sufficiently finely is likely to lead to scalability issues. Our algorithm,
in contrast, generates pure strategies for the leader in an informed way that results
in an exact solution. Moreover, as we will see, experimentally our algorithm requires
the generation of only very few strategies, so that there can be little doubt that this
is preferable to the uninformed discretization approach.
1 Note that we are just doing this at a conceptual level; we never actually write down this (infinite-
sized) tree.
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3.2 Equilibria May Require Randomizing over Distributions
Because pure strategies for the leader in the extensive-form game are distributions
over Al, it follows that mixed strategies for the leader are distributions over distri-
butions. However, one may be skeptical as to whether it is ever really necessary to
randomize over distributions, rather than just simplifying the strategy back down to
a single distribution. In this subsection, we show that for some games, randomizing
over distributions is in fact necessary, in the sense that there is no equilibrium of the
extensive-form game in which the leader plays a pure strategy.
EL L R ER
U 9,10 0,9 1,8 10,0
D 10,0 1,8 0,9 9,10
Figure 3.2: An example normal-form game.
Consider the example game in Figure 3.2. This game has no pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. The unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium profile of this game is
xp0.5, 0.5q, p0, 0.5, 0.5, 0qy.2 The row player’s utility from playing this equilibrium is
0.5. In contrast, in the Stackelberg model, the row player can commit to playing U,
so that the column player best-responds with EL, which results in a utility of 9 for
the row player. The row player can achieve an even higher utility by committing to
a mixed strategy. If the row player commits to playing U with probability 8{9   
and D with probability 1{9 , the column player’s best-response is still EL, and the
row player’s utility is approximately 9 1{9. The Stackelberg solution is the limit as
Ñ 0. (Note that there are symmetric solutions on the other side of the game where
2 The equilibrium is unique because of the following. If the row player plays U with probability ¿
0.5, then only EL and L can be best responses for the column player, but then U cannot be a best
response for the row player. By symmetry, the row player also cannot play D with probability ¿
0.5. Hence any equilibrium has the row player playing p0.5, 0.5q. Only L and R are best responses
to this for the column player, and the only way to put probability on these to keep the row player
indifferent between U and D is p0, 0.5, 0.5, 0q.
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the row player puts most of the probability on D and the column player responds
with ER.)
Now consider the extensive-form variant of this game where the leader’s (row
player’s) distribution is observed with probability pobs  .99. Because the leader’s
distribution is almost always observed, it is suboptimal for the leader to put positive
probability on any distribution that has probability strictly between 1{9 and 8{9 on
U. This is because, when observed (which happens almost always), such distributions
would incentivize the follower to play L or R, whereas any more extreme distributions
will incentivize the follower to play EL or ER, leading to much higher utilities for
the leader. (We recall that, upon observing the distribution, the follower is assumed
to break ties in the leader’s favor for technical reasons, though this is not essential
for the example.)
It is also suboptimal to put positive probability on any distribution that puts
strictly more than 8{9 probability on U. This is because, as long as the probability
on U is at least 8{9, any unit of probability mass placed on D results in a utility of
10 rather than 9 in the .99 of cases where the follower observes; this outweighs any
benefit that placing this unit of probability elsewhere might have in the .01 of cases
where the follower does not observe. Similarly, putting positive probability on any
distribution that puts strictly less than 1{9 probability on U is suboptimal. Hence,
all of the leader’s mass is either on the distribution p8{9, 1{9q or on the distribution
p1{9, 8{9q.
If the leader places all her mass on the distribution p8{9, 1{9q, the follower is in-
centivized to play EL all the time. However, if this is so, the leader has an incentive
to deviate to p1{9, 8{9q. This is because this distribution will give her just as high a
utility as p8{9, 1{9q if it is observed (the follower will respond with ER); however, if it
is not observed, the follower will not know that the leader has deviated and still play
EL, and p1{9, 8{9q gives a higher utility against EL than p8{9, 1{9q. Hence there is
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no equilibrium where the leader places all her mass on p8{9, 1{9q (and, by symmetry,
there is none where the leader places all her mass on p1{9, 8{9q). In fact, by similar
reasoning as that used to establish the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the
original game, we can conclude that in equilibrium the leader must randomize uni-
formly between p8{9, 1{9q and p1{9, 8{9q; the follower must then respond accordingly
with EL or ER when he observes the distribution, and when he does not observe
the distribution he must randomize uniformly between L and R (to keep the leader
indifferent between her two distributions). Hence, this is the unique equilibrium.
3.3 The Algorithm
We now present our algorithm for solving for an equilibrium of the extensive-form
game (Figure 3.1). The intuition behind the algorithm is as follows. As we have
already pointed out, after applying backward induction to the left-hand side of the
extensive-form game, the follower’s pure strategy space in the extensive-form game
is simply Af (corresponding to the action he takes on the right-hand side), which is
manageable. What is not manageable is the space of all the leader pure strategies in
the extensive form: there is one for every distribution over Al, so there are infinitely
many. This prevents us from simply writing down the normal-form game correspond-
ing to the extensive-form game and solving that. (Note that this is not the same as
the original normal-form game that has no uncertainty about observability.)
To address this, we start with a limited set of leader distributions (for example,
the set of all |Al| degenerate distributions), and solve for a Nash equilibrium of this
restricted game. This will give us a mixed strategy for the follower; the next step
is to find the best leader pure strategy (distribution over Al) in response to this
follower mixed strategy. As we will see, technically, this corresponds to solving for
a Stackelberg solution of an appropriately modified normal-form game. We then
add the resulting distribution to the set of leader distributions, solve for a new
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equilibrium, etc., until convergence.
This type of strategy generation approach has been applied to solve various games
where the strategy space is too large to write down (McMahan et al., 2003; Halvorson
et al., 2009; Jain et al., 2010). (It has a close relation to the notion of constraint
/ column generation in linear programming.) Usually, this is because the strategy
space is combinatorial—but it is finite, and hence the algorithm is guaranteed to
converge eventually. In our case, however, there is a continuum of leader strategies,
so we have to prove convergence, which we will do later.
Our algorithm for finding an equilibrium of the extensive-form game is shown in
Figure 3.3. In this algorithm, GpD,Af q is a normal-form game, more specifically it
is the normal-form game corresponding to the extensive-form game, except that the
leader can only choose from the distributions in D.
D Ð any finite non-empty set of distributions over Al
Loop:
G Ð GpD,Af q
xsGl , sfy Ð FIND-NEpGq
s1l Ð LEADER-BRpsf q
If uGl ps
1
l, sf q ¤ u
G
l ps
G
l , sf q Then
Return xsGl , sfy
Else
D Ð D Y ts1lu
Figure 3.3: The algorithm.
At any point, D is the set of distributions for the leader that we have generated
so far. We find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium xsGl , sfy of a normal-form game G
in which the leader’s set of pure strategies is D, the follower’s set of pure strategies
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is Af , and the players’ utilities for the outcome pd, af q are defined as follows.
uGl pd, af q  pobsEaldrulpal,FOLLOWER-BRobspdqqs
  p1 pobsqEaldrulpal, af qs (3.1)
uGf pd, af q  pobsEaldruf pal,FOLLOWER-BRobspdqqs
  p1 pobsqEaldruf pal, af qs (3.2)
Here d P D is a distribution over Al; al is the leader’s action drawn according to
d; and af P Af is the follower’s action. ul and uf correspond to the utilities in the
original normal-form game (that did not model uncertain observability). In each
of these formulas, the first summand corresponds to the case where the follower
observes the leader’s chosen distribution over Al, so that the follower best-responds
to that distribution; the second summand corresponds to the case where the follower
does not observe the leader’s distribution over Af , so that the follower will follow
his strategy af for the right-hand side of the extensive-form game. The follower’s
best-response is computed as follows.
FOLLOWER-BRobspdq P arg max
afPA

f
Ealdrulpal, af qs
Af  arg max
afPAf
Ealdruf pal, af qs
That is, the follower maximizes his expected utility, breaking the ties in favor of the
leader.3
We then check whether sGl is actually a best-response to sf if the leader considers
all possible distributions over Al (we only know for sure that it is a best response
among the restricted set D). To do that, we compute a best-response distribution
s1l over Al that maximizes the leader’s expected utility u
1
dps
1
l, sf q. If it turns out
3 This is a common assumption in Stackelberg games; without it, it may happen that no solution
exists. Specifically, if the original normal-form game is generic, then the follower breaks ties in
the leader’s favor in every subgame-perfect equilibrium of the regular Stackelberg extensive-form
game (von Stengel and Zamir, 2010).
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that u1dps
1
l, sf q is equal to the leader’s utility in the computed Nash equilibrium of
the game, then it follows that sGl is a best response to sf , and because sf is also a
best response to sGl , we can return xs
G
l , sfy as an equilibrium of the extensive-form
game with uncertain observability. Otherwise, we add distribution s1l to D, and the
algorithm continues on to the next iteration, in which we construct a new game G,
compute its Nash equilibrium, and so on.
In Subsection 3.3.1, we show how to compute the leader’s best response
LEADER-BRpsf q efficiently using a set of linear programs (corresponding to a Stack-
elberg solve). In Subsection 3.3.2, we show how the algorithm solves the example
game in Figure 3.2 with pobs  .99. In Subsection 3.3.3, we show that the algorithm
converges in a finite number of iterations.
3.3.1 Computing the Leader’s Best Response
In this section, we describe an efficient way to compute a distribution s1l over the
leader’s actions Al such that the leader’s utility of playing s
1
l is maximized assuming
that the follower plays a given strategy sf . That is, s
1
l is the leader’s best response
to the follower’s mixed strategy sf , denoted by LEADER-BRpsf q in the algorithm
shown in Figure 3.3.
Our goal is to formulate LEADER-BR as a linear program. However, the leader’s
utility is not linear in s1l in the case where the follower observes the leader’s mixed
strategy, because the leader’s utility depends on the follower’s best response to this
observation, which can be different for different values of s1l. Hence, we use a trick that
is also used in computing Stackelberg strategies (with certain observability) (Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel and Zamir, 2010): we write an LP that maximizes
the leader’s expected utility under the constraint that the follower’s best response in
the observed case is a fixed action af . To find the leader’s best response to sf overall,
we solve such an LP for each af P Af ; we obtain a best response for the leader by
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choosing the optimal solution vector s1l for an LP with the highest objective value
(leader utility). Note that some of these LPs may be infeasible.
Specifically, given af , sf , we solve the following LP, whose variables are the p
1
al
.
Maximize pobs
¸
alPAl
p1alulpal, a

f q
  p1 pobsq
¸
alPAl
¸
afPAf
p1alqafulpal, af q
Subject to
@af P Af :
¸
alPAl
p1aluf pal, a

f q ¥
¸
alPAl
p1aluf pal, af q
¸
alPAl
p1al  1
@al P Al : p
1
al
¥ 0
This formulation is almost identical to the standard one for solving for a Stackel-
berg strategy (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel and Zamir, 2010), except
the objective is different to account for the fact that the follower may not observe
the distribution. In fact, if we modify the leader’s utility function to u
sf
l pal, a

f q 
pobsulpal, a

f q   p1 pobsq
°
afPAf
sf paf qulpal, af q, then the objective simplifies to
°
alPAl
p1alu
sf
l pal, a

f q, and we obtain the standard Stackelberg formulation. Hence, we
are just doing a Stackelberg solve on a modified game.
3.3.2 An Example Run of the Algorithm
In this section, we demonstrate how the algorithm computes an equilibrium of the
uncertain-observability extensive-form game for the payoff matrix shown in Fig-
ure 3.2, with probability of observability pobs  0.99. (We already solved for the
equilibrium of this game analytically in Section 3.2—the purpose here is to show
how the algorithm finds this equilibrium.) In this game, there are two actions in Al,
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so each leader distribution is represented by a vector of two numbers summing to 1.
Initialization. We initialize the set of leader distributions with the two degenerate
distributions over Al: the distribution p1, 0q corresponds to the leader always playing
U, and the distribution p0, 1q corresponds to the leader always playing D. The normal-
form game for the current set of distributions D  tp1, 0q, p0, 1qu and the utilities
uGl , u
G
f computed according to Equations (3.1), (3.2) is shown in Figure 3.4. (Note
that the follower strategy has very little effect on the expected payoffs in this game;
this is because the follower strategy only concerns the “unobserved” part of the game,
which occurs very rarely in this game. The “observed” part has been preprocessed
with backward induction.)
EL L R ER
(1,0) 9,10 8.91, 9.99 8.92, 9.98 9.01, 9.9
(0,1) 9.01, 9.9 8.92, 9.98 8.91, 9.99 9,10
Figure 3.4: The normal-form game after the initialization.
Iteration 1. We first compute a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game shown
in Figure 3.4, namely, xp.5, .5q, p0, .5, .5, 0qy. Next, we compute the leader’s best
response to the follower’s mixed strategy p0, .5, .5, 0q. This results in the distribution
s1, in which the leader plays U with probability 8{9 and D with probability 1{9, so
that the follower’s best response to s1 is EL.
s1  p8{9qU   p1{9qD
It turns out that the leader’s utility from playing s1 against the follower’s mixed
strategy p0, .5, .5, 0q is higher than the leader’s utility in the current NE profile
xp.5, .5q, p0, .5, .5, 0qy. Thus, we add s1 to D. The resulting normal-form game is
shown in Figure 3.5.
Iteration 2. We compute a Nash equilibrium of the game shown in Figure 3.5,
namely, the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium xs1,Ly. The leader’s best response to
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EL L R ER
(1,0) 9,10 8.91, 9.99 8.92, 9.98 9.01, 9.9
(0,1) 9.01, 9.9 8.92, 9.98 8.91, 9.99 9,10
s1 9.11, 8.89 9.02, 8.89 9.03, 8.88 9.12, 8.81
Figure 3.5: The normal-form game after the first iteration.
the follower’s strategy L is s2, where
s2  p1{9qU   p8{9qD
The leader’s utility from playing s2 against L is higher than the leader’s utility from
playing s1 against L. Thus, we add s2 to the set D. The resulting normal-form game
is shown in Figure 3.6.
EL L R ER
(1,0) 9,10 8.91, 9.99 8.92, 9.98 9.01, 9.9
(0,1) 9.01, 9.9 8.92, 9.98 8.91, 9.99 9,10
s1 9.11, 8.89 9.02, 8.89 9.03, 8.88 9.12, 8.81
s2 9.12, 8.81 9.03, 8.88 9.02, 8.89 9.11, 8.89
Figure 3.6: The normal-form game after the second iteration.
Iteration 3. We compute a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the normal-form
game shown in Figure 3.6, namely, xp0, 0, .5, .5q, p0, .5, .5, 0qy. When we compute the
leader’s best-response to the follower’s mixed strategy p0, .5, .5, 0q, it turns out that
there is no distribution that gives the leader a utility higher than the leader’s utility
in the computed NE profile. Thus we have found an equilibrium of the uncertain-
observability extensive-form game, in which the leader plays s1 with probability .5
and s2 with probability .5, while the follower plays L with probability .5 and R with
probability .5.
34
3.3.3 A Bound on the Number of Iterations
In this section, we prove that the algorithm is guaranteed to find an equilibrium of
the extensive-form game in a finite number of iterations. For each af , the set of
leader mixed strategies Saf to which af is a best response is a polytope in R|Al|.
Denote the number of vertices of Saf by vpSaf q. Typical linear program solvers will
return a vertex of the feasible region; we will assume that we use such a solver. Then,
the number of iterations of our algorithm can be bounded as follows.
Theorem 1. The algorithm finds an equilibrium of the extensive-form game modeling
uncertain observability in no more than 1 
°
afPAf
vpSaf q iterations.
Proof. LEADER-BR returns the optimal solution to one of the linear programs in
Subsection 3.3.1. The feasible region of each of these linear programs is one of
the regions Saf . Hence, by the assumption on our LP solver, LEADER-BR always
returns a vertex of such a region.
When we generate a vertex corresponding to a distribution that is already in D,
we have converged: this vertex cannot be a better response to sf than sl, because
sl is a best response to sf among distributions in D. Because there are at most°
afPAf
vpSaf q distinct vertices to generate, the bound on the number of iterations
follows.
3.4 A Stronger Bound on the Leader’s Support Size
Theorem 1 implies that there always exists an equilibrium in which the leader ran-
domizes over at most 1 
¸
afPAf
vpSaf q distributions. This is still a rather loose bound.
The following theorem establishes a much tighter bound.
Theorem 2. In any uncertain-observability extensive-form game, there exists an
equilibrium in which the number of distributions on which the leader places positive
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probability is at most |Al|.
Proof. Let sl denote a distribution over leader actions, where slpalq denotes the
probability sl places on leader action al P Al. Suppose there is an equilibrium of the
whole game with sGl pslq denoting the leader probability on distribution sl, and sf paf q
denoting the follower probability on follower action af (conditional on the follower
not being able to observe). Let pipalq 
°
sl
sGl pslqslpalq be the marginal probability
that the leader plays al. Finally, let u
s
l pslq denote the utility that the leader would
get for committing to sl in a pure Stackelberg version of the game (corresponding to
the “observed” side of the game tree). Then, consider the following linear program
whose variables are p1sl (one for every distribution sl in the support of s
G
l ). (This LP
is just for the purpose of analysis.)
Maximize
¸
sl
p1slu
s
l pslq
Subject to
p@alq
¸
sl
p1slslpalq  pipalq
p@slq p
1
sl
¥ 0
That is, this linear program tries to modify the leader’s equilibrium strategy to
maximize the leader’s overall Stackelberg utility (the utility on the “observed” side
of the game tree) under the constraint that the marginal probabilities do not change
(so that nothing changes on the “unobserved” side of the tree).
The original equilibrium strategy sGl must be an optimal solution to this LP,
because, if we suppose to the contrary that there is a better solution, then the leader
would want to switch to that better solution (it would not change her utility on the
“unobserved” side and it would improve it on the “observed” side), contradicting the
equilibrium assumption. In fact, any optimal solution to this linear program must
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be an equilibrium when combined with the sf , because it will do just as well as s
G
l
for the leader, and the follower will still be best-responding (on the “unobserved”
side) because the marginal probabilities on the al remain the same. A linear program
with |Al| constraints (not counting the nonnegativity constraints for each variable)
must have an optimal solution with at most |Al| of its variables set to nonzero values
(which follows, for example, from the simplex algorithm). It follows that there
exists an equilibrium where the leader places positive probability on at most |Al|
distributions.
3.5 Experiments
The goal of our experiments is to study a number of properties of the proposed
algorithm and the solutions it generates. Since the bound on the number of iterations
given in Theorem 1 is quite loose, we want to measure the number of iterations and
the overall run time of the algorithm for different payoff matrices and values of pobs.
Another goal of the experiments is to measure the leader’s support size, that is, the
number of distributions played with positive probability in the leader’s equilibrium
strategy, which we showed to be bounded by the number of the leader’s actions
|Al| (Theorem 2). We also want to study the dependence of the leader’s equilibrium
utility on the probability of observability pobs. Finally, we want to find out how often
the leader’s equilibrium strategy in the extensive-form game is actually different from
Nash and Stackelberg strategies in the original normal-form game.
In our experimental results we consider 15  15 payoff matrices and vary pobs.
We used two different Nash equilibrium solvers, a MIP solver with different objec-
tives (Sandholm et al., 2005), and the Gambit (McKelvey et al., 2004) implemen-
tation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964). For the MIP
solver, we used three different objective functions: no objective, minimizing the size
of the leader support, and maximizing the leader utility.
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Figure 3.7: Experimental results
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We considered two distributions over games. The first distribution (uniform)
generated payoff matrices with individual payoffs drawn uniformly at random from
r0, 1s. The second (gamut) generated payoff matrices from the various game types
offered in GAMUT (Nudelman et al., 2004), with uniform weight given to each type.
Figures 3.7(a) and 3.7(b) show the run time of the different algorithms as a
function of pobs. One general trend is that the MIP solver that minimizes the leader
support is the fastest solver. One interesting difference is that run time generally
increases with pobs for the GAMUT distribution, but is fairly flat or decreasing for
uniform. The short run time is due to the low number of iterations, which we discuss
next.
Figures 3.7(c) and 3.7(d) show the number of iterations taken by the algorithm.
Each iteration corresponds to a complete pass through the loop in Figure 3.3, which
includes a Nash equilibrium computation in the extensive form game followed by a
LEADER-BR solve. The number of iterations generally tracks the run time fairly
closely. Two exceptions are GAMBIT and MIP with leader support minimization for
the GAMUT distribution. As we can see, the number of iterations is surprisingly low
compared to our theoretical bound of Theorem 1. We leave the question of whether
a tighter theoretical bound on the number of iterations can be obtained for future
research.
The support size (number of distributions over which the leader randomizes in
the equilibrium) is shown in Figures 3.7(e) and 3.7(f). The small support size is
explained in part by the low number of iterations. Since we initialize the algorithm
with |Al| pure strategies for the leader, the leader’s support size cannot be larger
than |Al| plus the number of iterations. However, it is significantly lower than that
bound.
Figures 3.7(g) and 3.7(h) show the leader’s expected utility in the equilibrium. As
expected, higher values of pobs lead to higher utility for the leader—this is the benefit
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of commitment. Using the MIP that maximizes leader utility (within a single Nash
solve) tends to lead to high leader utilities in the final equilibrium, but intriguingly
the MIP with no objective surpasses it for the GAMUT games.
Finally, Figures 3.7(i) and 3.7(j) show how often the leader’s equilibrium strategy
coincided with Stackelberg (full observability) or Nash (no observability) strategies
of the game. The Nash subroutine that is used by the algorithm here is the MIP
formulation that minimizes the support size. Naturally, the higher the value of
pobs is, the more often the equilibrium strategy coincides with Stackelberg and the
less often it coincides with Nash. In general, it coincides with Nash very often
and with Stackelberg quite often. We can also see that the equilibrium strategy
concides with both Nash and Stackelberg at the same time in a high percentage
of GAMUT games. This indicates that in certain game families, simply playing a
Nash/Stackelberg strategy of the original normal-form game is also an equilibrium
strategy in the extensive-form game with uncertain observability across intervals of
pobs. However, this is not the case in games with uniformly random payoffs, which
suggests the need for an algorithm like the one we present in this paper.
The main lessons that we take away from this set of experiments are as follows.
First, our proposed algorithm is quite fast in practice, especially compared to the
loose theoretical bound on the number of iterations that we established in Theorem 1.
Second, there are games in which the defender’s equilibrium strategy is sensitive to
the value of pobs, which suggests that it is important to model the uncertainty about
the observability. Third, there are families of games in which the equilibrium does
not change across wide intervals of pobs—in such cases, playing Nash or Stackelberg
strategies of the original normal-form game may be “good enough”.
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3.6 Discussion
We believe that our algorithm constitutes a useful addition to the toolbox of tech-
niques for computing game-theoretic solutions, especially in ambiguous real-world
domains. Strengths of the algorithm include that it can be applied to any game (as
opposed to, for instance, just security games), and it can also use as subroutines Nash
and Stackelberg solvers that are tailored to particular game families. The algorithm
is efficient in practice, and is guaranteed to produce a solution with support no larger
than the number of actions in the original game despite solving an extensive form
game with a potentially infinite branching factor.
A potential drawback to the overall framework, not the algorithm, is that it
requires us to determine the number pobs. This may not be an issue insofar as the so-
lution stays the same across a range of values of pobs, yet many open problems remain.
As pobs shrinks, we are more likely to encounter equilibrium selection problems—how
do we address these? What happens if we have some degree of control over pobs? Are
there other ways of addressing the problem of uncertainty about observability that
do not involve making the uncertainty explicit in the extensive form?
In the following chapters, we will consider the simpler models of simultaneous-
move games and Stackelberg games. We will focus on the computational complexity
of computing Nash equilibria and Stackelberg strategies in security games.
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4Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg
Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games
In this and the following chapters, we consider a class of two-player general-sum
games proposed by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). Security games have found a number
of applications related to homeland security. As was pointed out by Kiekintveld
et al. (2009), the applicability of the techniques for computing a Nash equilibrium
or a Stackelberg strategy based on the normal form of the game to security do-
mains is limited by the fact that the defender generally has exponentially many pure
strategies, so that it is not feasible to write out the entire normal form of the game.
Specifically, if there are m indistinguishable defensive resources, and n targets to
which they can be assigned (n ¡ m), then there are
 
n
m

pure strategies (allocations)
for the defender. Kiekintveld et al. point out that while the LAX application was
small enough to enumerate all strategies, this is not the case for new applications,
including the problem of assigning Federal Air Marshals to flights (Tsai et al., 2009).
They provide a nice framework for representing this type of problem; we follow this
framework in this chapter (and review it in the following section). However, their
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paper leaves open the computational complexity of finding the optimal Stackelberg
strategy in their framework. In this chapter, we resolve the complexity of all the
major variants in their framework, in some cases giving polynomial-time algorithms,
and in other cases giving NP-hardness results.
4.1 Security Games: Problem Description and Notation
Following Kiekintveld et al. (2009), we consider the following two-player general-
sum game. Player one (the “leader” or “defender”) commits to a mixed strategy to
allocate a set of resources to defend a set of targets.1 Player two (the “follower” or
“attacker”) observes the commitment and then picks one of the targets to attack.
The utilities of the players depend on which target was attacked and whether that
target was defended.
We will consider several variants of this game. Resources of the leader can be
either homogeneous, or there can be several types of resources, each with different
limitations on what they can defend. It can either be the case that a resource can be
assigned to at most one target, or it can be the case that a resource can be assigned
to a subset of the targets (such a subset is called a schedule). As we will see, the
complexity depends on the size of these schedules.
We will use the following notation to describe different variants of the problem.
• Targets. Described by a set T (|T |  n). A target t is covered if there is a
resource assigned to t (in the case of no schedules), or if a resource is assigned
to a schedule that includes t.
• Schedules. Described by a collection of subsets of targets Σ  2T . Here, σ P Σ
is a subset of targets that can be simultaneously covered by some resource. We
1 In this thesis, we assume that the set of resources is fixed, as is the case in practice in the short
term. For long-term planning, it may be useful to consider settings where additional resources can
be obtained at a cost (Bhattacharya et al., 2011; Letchford and Vorobeychik, 2012), but we will
not do so in this thesis.
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assume that any subset of a schedule is also a schedule, that is, if σ1  σ and
σ P Σ, then σ1 P Σ. When resources are assigned to individual targets, we
have (by a slight abuse of notation) Σ  T YtHu, where H corresponds to not
covering any target.
• Resources. Described by a set Ω (|Ω|  m). When the resources are hetero-
geneous, a function H : Ω Ñ 2Σ is given, where Hpωq is the set of schedules to
which resource ω can be assigned. We assume that if σ1  σ and σ P Hpωq, then
σ1 P Hpωq—that is, if a resource can cover a set of targets simultaneously, then
it can also cover any subset of that set of targets simultaneously. If resources
are homogeneous, then we assume every resource can cover all schedules, that
is, Hpωq  Σ for all ω P Ω.
• Utility functions. If target t is attacked, the defender’s utility is ucdptq if t is
covered, or uudptq if t is not covered. The attacker’s utility is u
c
aptq if t is covered,
or uuaptq if t is not covered. We assume u
c
dptq ¥ u
u
dptq and u
c
aptq ¤ u
u
aptq. We
note that it makes no difference to the players’ utilities whether a target is
covered by one resource or by more than one resource.
LP notation. We will use linear programs in all of our positive results (polynomial-
time algorithms). We now describe some of the variables used in these linear pro-
grams.
• ct is the probability of target t being covered.
• cs is the probability of schedule σ being covered.
• cω,s is the probability of resource ω being assigned to schedule σ.
Let c denote the vector of probabilities pc1, . . . , cnq. Then, the utilities of the leader
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and the follower can be computed as follows, given c and the target t being attacked:
udpt, cq  ctu
c
dptq   p1 ctqu
u
dptq
uapt, cq  ctu
c
aptq   p1 ctqu
u
aptq
These equalities are implicit in all of our linear programs and, for brevity, are not
repeated.
4.2 Heterogeneous Resources, Singleton Schedules
We first consider the case in which schedules have size 1 or 0 (that is, resources are
assigned to individual targets or not at all, so that Σ  T Y tHu). We show that
here, we can find an optimal strategy for the leader in polynomial time. Kiekintveld
et al. (2009) gave a mixed-integer program formulation for this problem, and proved
that feasible solutions for this program correspond to mixed strategies in the game.
However, they did not show how to compute the mixed strategy in polynomial time.
Our linear program formulation is similar to their formulation, and we show how
to construct the mixed strategy from the solution, using the Birkhoff-von Neumann
theorem (Birkhoff, 1946).
To solve the problem, we actually solve multiple LPs: for each target t, we solve
an LP that computes the best mixed strategy to commit to, under the constraint
that the attacker is incentivized to attack t. We then solve all of these LPs, and
take the solution that maximizes the leader’s utility. This is similar to the set of
linear programs from Section 4.1, except those linear programs require a variable for
each pure strategy for the defender, so that these LPs have exponential size in our
domain. Instead, we will write a more compact LP to find the probability cω,t of
assigning resource ω to target t, for each ω and t P Hpωq. (If t R Hpωq, then there is
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no variable cω,t.)
maximize udpt
, cq
subject to
@ω P Ω, @t P Hpωq : 0 ¤ cω,t ¤ 1
@t P T : ct 
¸
ωPΩ:tPHpωq
cω,t ¤ 1
@ω P Ω :
¸
tPHpωq
cω,t ¤ 1
@t P T : uapt, cq ¤ uapt
, cq
The advantage of this LP is that it is more compact than the one that considers all
pure strategies. The downside is that it is not immediately clear whether we can
actually implement the computed probabilities (that is, whether they correspond to
a probability distribution over allocations of resources to targets, and how this mixed
strategy can be found). Below we show that the obtained probabilities can, in fact,
be implemented.
4.2.1 Constructing a Strategy that Implements the LP Solution
We will make heavy use of the following theorem which we state in a somewhat more
general form than it is usually stated.
Theorem 3 (Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, Birkhoff 1946). Consider an m  n
matrix M with real numbers aij P r0, 1s, such that for each 1 ¤ i ¤ m,
°n
j1 aij ¤ 1,
and for each 1 ¤ j ¤ n,
°m
i1 aij ¤ 1. Then, there exist matrices M
1,M2, . . . ,M q,
and weights w1, w2, . . . , wq P p0, 1s, such that:
1.
°q
k1w
k  1;
2.
°q
k1w
kMk M ;
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Figure 4.1: An example of how to apply the BvN theorem. Top Left: Resource
ω1 can cover targets t1, t2, t3; ω2 can cover t2, t3. Top Right: The LP returns the
marginal probabilities in the table. We must now obtain these marginal probabilities
as a probability mixture over pure strategies, in which every resource is assigned to
a separate target. Bottom: The BvN theorem decomposes the top right table into a
mixture over pure strategies. It first places probability .1 on the pure strategy on the
left, then .2 on the pure strategy to the right of that, and so on. It is easily checked
that with the resulting mixture over pure strategies, the marginal probabilities in
the top right table are obtained.
3. for each 1 ¤ k ¤ q, the elements of Mk are akij P t0, 1u;
4. for each 1 ¤ k ¤ q, we have: for each 1 ¤ i ¤ m,
°n
j1 a
k
ij ¤ 1, and for each
1 ¤ j ¤ n,
°m
i1 a
k
ij ¤ 1.
Moreover, q is Oppm   nq2q, and the Mk and wk can be found in Oppm   nq4.5q
time using Dulmage-Halperin algorithm (Dulmage and Halperin, 1955; Chang et al.,
2001).
We can use this theorem to convert the probabilities cω,t that we obtain from
our linear programming approach into a mixed strategy. This is because the cω,t
constitute an mn matrix that satisfies the conditions of the Birkhoff-von Neumann
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Figure 4.2: A counterexample that shows that with heterogeneous resources and
bipartite schedules, the linear program probabilities are not always implementable.
There are 4 targets (shown as circles), 4 schedules (solid edges), and 2 resources.
The resource ωh can be assigned to one of the horizontal edges and the resource ωd
can be assigned to one of the diagonal edges. In the optimal solution to the LP, the
probability of a resource being assigned to each edge is 0.5, so that it would seem
that the probability of each target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to see that
in reality, the two resources can cover at most 3 of the 4 targets simultaneously.
theorem. Each Mk that we obtain as a result of this application of the theorem
corresponds to a pure strategy in our domain: Mk consists of entries ckω,t P t0, 1u (by
3), which we can interpret to mean that ω is assigned to t if and only if ckω,t  1,
because of the conditions on Mk (in 4). Then, because the weights sum to 1 (by
1), we can think of
°q
k1w
kMk as a mixed strategy in our domain, which gives
us the right probabilities (by 2). According to the theorem, we can construct this
Figure 4.3: A counterexample that shows that with homogeneous resources and
schedules of size two that are not bipartite, the linear program probabilities are not
always implementable. The number of resources is m  3. 6 targets are represented
by vertices, 6 schedules are represented by edges. In the optimal solution to the LP,
the probability of a resource being assigned to each edge is 0.5, so that it would seem
that the probability of each target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to see that
in reality, the three resources can cover at most 5 of the 6 targets simultaneously.
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mixed strategy (represented as an explicit listing of the pure strategies in its support,
together with their probabilities) in polynomial time. An example is shown on Figure
4.1. From this analysis, the following theorem follows:
Theorem 4. When schedules have size 1 or 0, we can find an optimal Stackelberg
strategy in polynomial time, even with heterogeneous resources. This can be done by
solving a set of polynomial-sized linear programs and then applying the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem.
4.3 Heterogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 2, Bipartite Graph
In this section, we consider schedules of size two. When schedules have size two,
they can be represented as a graph, whose vertices correspond to targets and whose
edges correspond to schedules. In this section, we consider the special case where
this graph is bipartite, and give an NP-hardness proof for it.
One may wonder why this special case is interesting. In fact, it corresponds to the
Federal Air Marshals domain studied by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). In this domain,
flights are targets. If a Federal Air Marshal is to be scheduled on one outgoing flight
from the U.S. (to, say, Europe), and will then return on an incoming flight, this is a
schedule that involves two targets; moreover, there cannot be a schedule consisting of
two outgoing flights or of two incoming flights, so that we have the requisite bipartite
structure.
It may seem that the natural approach is to use a generalization of the linear
program from the previous section (or, the mixed integer program by Kiekintveld
et al. (2009)) to compute the marginal probabilities cω,σ that resource ω is assigned
to schedule σ; and, subsequently, to convert this into a distribution over pure strate-
gies that gives those marginal probabilities. However, it turns out that it is, in
some cases, impossible to find such a distribution over pure strategies. That is, the
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marginal probabilities from the linear program are not actually implementable. A
counterexample is shown in Figure 4.2. One may wonder if perhaps a different linear
program or other efficient algorithm can be given. We next show that this is unlikely,
because finding an optimal strategy for the leader in this case is actually NP-hard,
even in zero-sum games.
Theorem 5. When resources are heterogeneous, finding an optimal Stackelberg strat-
egy is NP-hard, even when schedules have size 2 and constitute a bipartite graph, and
the game is zero-sum.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary satisfiability instance, given by variables V and clauses
C, and reduce it to a game of the form in the theorem. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
reduction. For each variable in V , we create a cyclic bipartite graph with 2|C|
vertices (where the vertices are targets and the edges are schedules). Also, for each
clause in C, we create another two vertices and an edge between these two vertices.
Finally, we create |C| p|V |1q additional “dummy” schedules, each consisting of two
targets with an edge between them. For each variable xi, we create 2|C| resources,
ω1 xi , . . . , ω
|C|
 xi (corresponding to  x1—these are |C| homogeneous resources) and
ω1xi , . . . , ω
|C|
xi (corresponding to x1—again, these are |C| homogeneous resources).
Resource ω xki (for any k) can be assigned to:
• any even (horizontal) edge in the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to vari-
able xi;
• any edge corresponding to a clause that includes  xi; and
• any dummy edge.
Similarly, resource ωxki (for any k) can be assigned to:
• any odd (diagonal) edge in the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to variable
xi;
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Figure 4.4: Illustration for the NP-hardness reduction for heterogeneous resources,
schedules of size 2 constituting a bipartite graph. The boolean formula is p x1 _
x2_ x3q^ px1_ x2_ x3q^ px1_ x2_x3q. There are 36 targets (shown
as circles), 27 schedules (shown as solid edges), and 6 types of resources (shown as
triangles), of which there are 3 copies in each case. A dashed line from a resource
type to a schedule indicates that that resource can be assigned to that schedule.
The three cyclic bipartite graphs each correspond to a variable xi; the schedules σci
correspond to the three clauses in the formula.
• any edge corresponding to a clause that includes xi; and
• any dummy edge.
Finally, let the utilities be: @t : ucdptq  1, u
u
dptq  0, u
c
aptq  0, u
u
aptq  1, so that
we have a zero-sum game.
We now prove that the optimal utility for the leader in this game is 1 if and only
if the corresponding boolean formula is satisfiable.
51
The “if” case: Suppose there is an assignment of values t0, 1u to the variables
such that the formula evaluates to 1. Then we can assign the resources in the game
in the following way.
• For every clause in the boolean formula, choose one literal ( xi or xi) that
evaluates to “true” in the assignment. Assign one of the corresponding re-
sources (ωk xi or ω
k
xi
, for some k) to the schedule corresponding to the clause.
• For every xi  0 (xi  1), we assign all resources ωk xi (ωkxi) to cover the
entire cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to xi, using the horizontal (diagonal)
edges.
• Assign the remaining resources to cover all the “dummy” schedules.
The resulting assignment of resources covers all targets, so that if the defender plays
this pure strategy, the defender’s utility is 1 in the security game.
The “only if” case: Suppose there is a defender strategy σ that gives the
defender a utility of 1 in the Stackelberg game. Then, every target must be covered
with probability 1. That means that any pure strategy on which σ puts positive
probability must cover all the targets. So, without loss of generality, we can assume
σ is a pure strategy. We note that there are 2|C|  |V | resources and 4|C|  |V | targets
in the game. Since each schedule covers 2 targets, in σ, no two resources are assigned
to schedules that share a target. Thus, each cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to
a variable xi must have either all its horizontal edges covered (using all the ω
k
 xi
), or
all its diagonal edges covered (using all the ωkxi). If all the ω
k
 xi
are used to cover
horizontal edges, we set xi to 1; if all the ω
k
xi
are used to cover diagonal edges,
we set xi to 0. Now, for every clause c P C, the corresponding schedule is covered
by some resource. If it is covered by some ωk xi , then  xi P c, and because in that
case all the ωkxi must be used to cover the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to
52
xi (using the diagonal edges), it must be that xi  1. Similarly, if it is covered by
some ωkxi , then xi P c, and it must be that xi  0. Hence we have a satisfying
assignment.
If the resources are homogeneous, then it turns out that in the bipartite case,
we can solve for an optimal Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time, by using the
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem in a slightly different way. We consider that case in
the following section.
4.4 Homogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size at Most 2, Bipartite
Graph
In this section, we restrict ourselves to homogeneous resources, but now we consider
schedules of size two. When schedules have size two, they can be represented as a
graph, whose vertices correspond to targets and whose edges correspond to schedules.
In this section, we consider the special case where this graph is bipartite, and give a
polynomial-time solution for it, again based on the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
One may wonder why this special case is interesting. In fact, it corresponds to the
Federal Air Marshals domain studied by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). In this domain,
flights are targets. If a Federal Air Marshal is to be scheduled on one outgoing flight
from the U.S. (to, say, Europe), and will then return on an incoming flight, this is a
schedule that involves two targets; moreover, there cannot be a schedule consisting of
two outgoing flights or of two incoming flights, so that we have the requisite bipartite
structure.
We will use the following linear program to compute, for each schedule, the
probability that one of the (homogeneous) resources is assigned to that schedule.
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(Again, we need to solve n of these linear programs, one for each value of t.)
maximize udpt
, cq
subject to
@σ P Σ : cσ ¤ 1
@t P T : ct 
¸
σPΣ:tPσ
cσ ¤ 1
¸
σPΣ
cσ ¤ m
@t P T : uapt, cq ¤ uapt
, cq
We note that nothing about this program specifically corresponds to the bipartite-
schedules-of-size-two case. Indeed, it is very similar to the mixed integer program
for the general case presented by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). However, in the general
case, the solutions returned by both this linear program and the known mixed integer
program do not always correspond to implementable mixed strategies (we will give
counterexamples shortly). The contribution of this section is to show that in the
bipartite-schedules-of-size-two case, the solutions are in fact implementable.
4.4.1 Constructing a Strategy that Implements the LP Solution
Again, we will use the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem to show this. Actually, we
will use a slightly stronger version of the theorem (which is not difficult to prove
using the basic version, Theorem 3), as follows:
Theorem 6 (Strengthening of BvN). If the matrix M in Theorem 3 additionally
satisfies
°m
i1
°n
j1 aij ¤ p, where p is an integer, then we can obtain matrices M
k
that additionally have the property that for each 1 ¤ k ¤ q,
°m
i1
°n
j1 a
k
ij ¤ p.
Again, we will construct a matrix of probabilities M , where the probabilities in
each row and the probabilities in each column sum to at most 1. Because the graph
54
is bipartite, the targets partition into T1, T2, with no edges inside T1 or inside T2.
The substochastic matrix M is constructed as follows.
M 

Ms MT1
MT2 0|T2||T1|


Here, 0|T2||T1| is a matrix of size |T2|  |T1|, consisting of only zeroes. The rows of
the submatrix Ms correspond to the targets in T1, and the columns of Ms correspond
to the targets in T2. Each entry of the matrix Ms is the probability ctt1,t2u that the
schedule tt1, t2u is covered.
To represent the schedules of size 1, we use two square diagonal submatrices MT1
and MT2 . For y P t1, 2u, element pi, iq of matrix MTy is equal to the probability cttiu
of a resource being assigned to cover target ti P Ty by itself; all the entries off the
diagonal are 0.
By applying the strengthened Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, we can decompose
M into a convex combination of 0-1 matrices Mk, such that M 
°q
k1w
kMk. Every
row and every column of each matrix Mk contains no more than one element equal
to 1, and the total number of 1s in Mk is no more than m. Each Mk corresponds to a
pure strategy for the defender. The pure strategy corresponding to 0-1 matrix Mk is
to place a defensive resource on every schedule of size two for which the corresponding
cell of the submatrix Ms is equal to 1, and to place a resource on every schedule of size
one for which the corresponding cell of the diagonal submatrix MT1 or MT2 is equal
to 1. No target is covered twice in any one of these pure strategies, because for each
t P T1 (t P T2), there is at most one 1 in the row (column) corresponding to that t.
The mixed strategy is to play the pure strategy corresponding to Mk with probability
wk, for 1 ¤ k ¤ q. By doing so, the probability of covering target t P T1 is indeed
cttu  
°
tPT2
ctt1,t2u  ct (and similarly for t P T2). Hence, the marginal probabilities
obtained from the linear program correspond to an implementable strategy.
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Figure 4.5: A counterexample that shows that with homogeneous resources and
schedules of size three, the linear program probabilities are not always implementable.
The number of resources is m  2. 6 targets are represented by round nodes,
6 schedules are represented by square nodes with connections to the targets that
they include. In the optimal solution to the LP, the probability of a resource being
assigned to each schedule is 0.5, so that it would seem that the probability of each
target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to see that in reality, the two resources
can cover at most 5 of the 6 targets simultaneously.
Theorem 7. When resources are homogeneous and schedules have size at most 2,
and constitute a bipartite graph, we can find an optimal Stackelberg strategy in poly-
nomial time. This can be done by solving a set of polynomial-sized linear programs
and then applying the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
4.5 Homogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 2
We now return to the case where resources are homogeneous and schedules have
size 2, but now we no longer assume that the graph is bipartite. It turns out that
if we use the linear program approach, the resulting marginal probabilities cs are
in general not implementable, that is, there is no mixed strategy that attains these
marginal probabilities. A counterexample is shown in Figure 4.3. This would appear
to put us in a position similar to that in the previous section. However, it turns out
that here we can actually solve the problem in polynomial time, using a different
approach. Our approach here is to use the standard linear programming approach
from Section 4.1. The downside of using such approach is that there are exponentially
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many variables. In contrast, the dual linear program has only n   1 variables, but
exponentially many constraints. One approach to solving a linear program with
exponentially many constraints is the following: start with only a small subset of
the constraints, and solve the resulting reduced linear program. Then, using some
other method, check whether the solution is feasible for the full (original) linear
program; and if not, find a violated constraint. If we have a violated constraint, we
add it to the set of constraints, and repeat. Otherwise, we have found an optimal
solution. This process is known as constraint generation. Moreover, if a violated
constraint can be found in polynomial time, then the original linear program can
be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid algorithm. As we will show, in the
case of homogeneous resources and schedules of size two, we can efficiently generate
constraints in the dual linear program by solving a weighted matching problem.
While this solution is less appealing than our earlier solutions based on the Birkhoff-
von Neumann theorem, it still results in a polynomial-time algorithm. The dual
linear program follows.
minimize y
subject to
@α :
¸
tPT
ytpuapα, tq  uapα, t
qq   y ¥ udpα, t
q
y P R
Now, we consider the constraint generation problem for the dual LP. Given a (not
necessarily feasible) solution yt, y to the dual, we need to find the most violated
constraint, or verify that the solution is in fact feasible. Our goal is to find, given
the candidate solution yt, y,
α P arg max
α
udpα, t
q 
¸
tPT
ytpuapα, tq  uapα, t
qq  y
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We introduce an indicator function Iαptq which is equal to 1 if t is covered by α, and
0 otherwise. Then
uapα, tq  u
u
aptq   Iαptqpu
c
aptq  u
u
aptqq
udpα, tq  u
u
dptq   Iαptqpu
c
dptq  u
u
dptqq
Then, we can rearrange the optimization problem as follows.
α P arg max
α
uudpt
q   Iαpt
qpucdpt
q  uudpt
qq
 y 
¸
tPT
ytpu
u
aptq   Iαptqpu
c
aptq  u
u
aptqqq
 
¸
tPT
ytpu
u
apt
q   Iαpt
qpucapt
q  uuapt
qqq
 uudpt
q  y 
¸
tPT
ytpu
u
aptq  u
u
apt
qq
 
¸
tPT
Iαptqytpu
u
aptq  u
u
aptqq
 Iαpt
qpuuapt
q  ucapt
qq
¸
tPT
yt
We define a weight function on the targets as follows:
wptq  ytpu
u
aptq  u
c
aptqq for t  t

wptq  puuapt
q  ucapt
qq
¸
tPT,tt
yt
We then rearrange the optimization problem as follows:
α P arg max
α
wpαq   uudpt
q 
¸
tPT
ytpu
u
aptq  u
u
apt
qq  y
where wpαq is the total weight of the targets covered by the pure strategy α: wpαq 
°
tPYsPαs
wptq. The only part of the objective that depends on α is wpαq, so we can
focus on finding an α that maximizes wpαq. A pure strategy α is a collection of
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edges (schedules consisting of pairs of targets). Therefore, the problem of finding
an α with maximum weight is a maximum weighted 2-cover problem, which can be
solved in polynomial time (for example, using a modification of the algorithm for
finding a maximal weighted matching in general graphs (Galil et al., 1986)). So,
we can solve the constraint generation problem, and hence the whole problem, in
polynomial time. From this analysis, the following theorem follows:
Theorem 8. When resources are homogeneous and schedules have size at most 2,
we can find an optimal Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time. This can be done
by solving the standard Stackelberg linear programs (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006;
von Stengel and Zamir, 2010): these programs have exponentially many variables,
but the constraint generation problem for the dual can be solved in polynomial time
in this case.
4.6 Homogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 3
We now move on to the case of homogeneous resources with schedules of size 3. Once
again, it turns out that if we use the linear program approach, the resulting marginal
probabilities cs are in general not implementable; that is, there is no mixed strategy
that attains these marginal probabilities. A counterexample is shown in Figure 4.5.
We now show that finding an optimal strategy for the leader in this case is actually
NP-hard, even in zero-sum games.
Theorem 9. When schedules have size 3, finding an optimal Stackelberg strategy is
NP-hard, even when resources are homogeneous and the game is zero-sum.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary 3-cover problem instance—in which we are given a
universe U , a family S of subsets of U , such that each subset contains 3 elements,
and we are asked whether we can (exactly) cover all of U using |U |{3 elements of
S—to a game with homogeneous resources and schedules of size 3. We create one
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target for each element of U , and one schedule for each element of S, which covers
the targets in it. We also create |U |{3 homogeneous resources that each can cover
any schedule. The utilities are @t : ucdptq  u
u
aptq  1, u
u
dptq  u
c
aptq  0.
First, we will show that the answer is “yes” in the set cover problem instance
if there is defender strategy that gives the defender the utility of 1. Suppose there
is defender strategy C that gives the defender the utility of 1 in the Stackelberg
setting. Since the game is zero sum, the attacker’s utility must be 0. It must be that
uapt, Cq  0 for each t P T . That implies ct  1 for all t. Then each target must be
covered in each pure strategy over which the defender is mixing in C. Thus there
exists a pure strategy that covers each target with no more than k resources. The
set of schedules covered in that strategy corresponds to the subfamily C of size no
more than k such that the union of subsets in C is exactly U .
Next, we will show that if there exists a subfamily C of size no more than k,
then there is defender strategy that gives the defender utility of 1 in the Stackelberg
game. Consider a pure strategy in which the defender assigns a resource to each
schedule that corresponds to a subset in C. Such pure strategy covers every target.
If the defender plays this pure strategy, attacker’s utility from attacking any target
is equal to 0. Since the game is zero sum, the defender’s utility is 1.
We have shown that the answer to the 3-Set Cover problem is positive if and only
if the leader’s utility in the corresponding resource allocation game is 1.
4.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we characterized in which security games the problem of computing a
Stackelberg strategy is solvable in polynomial time and in which cases it is NP-hard.
We summarize thre results in Figure 4.7.
Our results are perhaps made more interesting by the paper by Korzhyk et al.
(2011), which shows that for all of the security games that we studied, an optimal
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Figure 4.6: Summary of the computational results. All of the hardness results hold
even for zero-sum games.
Stackelberg strategy is guaranteed to also be a Nash equilibrium strategy in the
version of the game where commitment is not possible. (The converse does not hold,
that is, there can be Nash equilibrium strategies that are not Stackelberg strategies.)
Thus, our polynomial-time algorithm results also allow us to find a Nash equilibrium
strategy for the defender in polynomial time. Conversely, for the cases where we prove
a hardness result, finding a Nash equilibrium strategy is also NP-hard, because our
hardness results hold even for zero-sum games.
In the next chapter, we consider an extended security games model in which the
attacker may choose multiple targets for a simultaneous attack.
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5Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources
The security games model by Kiekintveld et al. (2009) discussed in the previous
chapter was further extended by Korzhyk et al. (2011) to allow multiple attacker
resources; that is, the attacker can simultaneously attack up to na different targets.
This extension is motivated by the fact that terrorist attacks are often performed at
multiple locations simultaneously (for example, the 9/11 attacks or the 2008 Mumbai
attacks).
In the case of a single attacker resource, Kiekintveld et al. give a simple algo-
rithm called ORIGAMI for the single attacker resource case. It computes a defender
strategy that is both a Stackelberg and a Nash strategy (the latter follows from the
work of Korzhyk et al. (2011)). The main observation used in ORIGAMI is that any
Stackelberg strategy for the defender minimizes the attacker’s best-response utility.
Using this observation, ORIGAMI computes the defender’s Nash/Stackelberg strat-
egy by gradually decreasing the attacker’s best-response utility, keeping track of the
number of defender resources required to bring the attacker’s best-response utility
down to this level, until the number of required defender resources reaches the limit.
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However, in games with multiple attacker resources, the defender’s minimax strategy
is not necessarily a Nash or Stackelberg strategy. Consider the following example
(by Korzhyk et al. (2011)). Suppose there are two targets, and the attacker has
two resources, so that both targets will be attacked no matter what strategy the
defender chooses. If the defender has only one resource, then the defender is better
off allocating that resource in such a way that the defender’s utility increases the
most. However, in the defender’s minimax strategy, the defender would allocate the
resource so that the attacker’s utility is reduced the most. Thus the defender’s Nash
and Stackelberg strategies can differ from the minimax strategy in this example.
In this chapter, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilib-
rium in the case of multiple attacker resources. This algorithm can be thought of as
a generalization of ORIGAMI in the sense that it also keeps track of the smallest
utility that the attacker is going to get from any of his targets, and this utility grad-
ually decreases over the course of the algorithm. However, our algorithm is far more
complicated compared to ORIGAMI. Furthermore, we show that Nash equilibria
in security games with multiple attacker resources possess the interchange property,
which states that as long as each player plays some equilibrium strategy, the resulting
strategy profile must be a Nash equilibrium, thus resolving the problem of equilib-
rium selection for both players. On the other hand, we show that, with multiple
attacker resources, computing a defender Stackelberg strategy is actually NP-hard.
5.1 The Model
In the security games that we study, there is a set of targets, T . The defender has
nd resources and the attacker has na resources. A pure strategy for the defender
(attacker) consists of a subset ad  T with |ad|  nd (aa  T with |aa|  na),
corresponding to the targets she defends (he attacks). Targets that are not attacked
do not affect either player’s utility. Each player’s utility is additive over attacked
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targets. For a target t, the defender receives utility uudptq if the target is attacked but
not defended (uncovered), and ucdptq if the target is attacked and defended (covered).
Similarly, the attacker’s utility for an attacked target t is uuaptq in the uncovered
case and ucaptq in the covered case. (We require ∆udptq  u
c
dptq  u
u
dptq ¡ 0 and
∆uaptq  u
u
aptq  u
c
aptq ¡ 0.) Hence, the defender’s overall utility is
°
tPaaXad
ucdptq  °
tPaazad
uudptq, and the attacker’s overall utility is
°
tPaaXad
ucaptq  
°
tPaazad
uuaptq.
Because of the additive nature of the utility function, the players’ expected utili-
ties depend only on the marginal probability that each target is attacked/defended.
Hence, a defender mixed strategy can be represented as a vector
sd  psdpt1q, . . . , sdpt|T |qq with
°
tPT sdptq  nd, where sdptq P r0, 1s is the prob-
ability that target t obtains a defensive resource, and similarly for the attacker
sa  psapt1q, . . . , sapt|T |qq with
°
tPT saptq  na, saptq P r0, 1s. (Note that it does
not help to have more than one resource on one target. This assumption was intro-
duced in the security game model by Kiekintveld et al. (2009).)
We will use the following shorthand: uapt, sdptqq  sdptqu
c
aptq   p1 sdptqqu
u
aptq is
the attacker’s expected utility for attacking target t, and υdpt, saptqq  saptq∆udptq
is the marginal expected utility that the defender gets from defending t.
5.2 Nash Equilibrium
We now consider how to compute a Nash equilibrium of a security game with multiple
attacker resources. Because of the additive nature of the utility functions, best-
responding simply means defending (attacking) the nd (na) targets with the highest
utility for the defender (attacker). If there is a tie for the ndth (nath) place, then it is
possible to randomize over the corresponding targets. Therefore, sd is a best response
to sa iff there exists some threshold marginal utility θd such that υdpt, saptqq   θd ñ
sdptq  0 and υdpt, saptqq ¡ θd ñ sdptq  1. Similarly, sa is a best response to sd
iff there exists some threshold utility θa such that uapt, sdptqq   θa ñ saptq  0 and
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uapt, sdptqq ¡ θa ñ saptq  1. Hence, we have a Nash equilibrium iff both these
conditions are satisfied. Note that the defender’s (and, similarly, the attacker’s)
strategy can be mixed (randomized), because any target t such that υdpt, saptqq  θd
can be defended with a fractional probability sdptq P r0, 1s. Similarly, the attacker’s
strategy can also be mixed.
The high-level idea of our algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium is as
follows. We start with a modified game where the defender has no resources at
all, for which it is straightforward to compute an equilibrium, and then we gradually
increase the number of defender resources (not necessarily to integral amounts), while
maintaining an equilibrium of the game as it is changing—until we arrive at the
actual number of defender resources. The algorithm transitions among phases that
correspond to phases of qualitatively different behavior in the process of increasing
the number of defender resources. The change resulting from a single phase can be
computed through a simple calculation.
5.2.1 Detailed Example Run of the Algorithm
Before we present the algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium, we first give a
detailed example of how it solves a particular game. This example demonstrates the
different phases of the algorithm. During these phases, each target will be considered
to be in one of 6 possible states: Untouched (U), Newly Attacked (NA), Pending (P),
Active (A), Defender Saturated (DS), and Done (D). We will informally introduce
every state in this example (precise definitions can be found in the algorithm in
Figure 5.2). The target states depend on the values of the thresholds θa, θd, which are
computed at the beginning and gradually decrease during the course of the algorithm.
Example 1. Consider a game with |T |  4 targets, nd  3 defender resources, and
na  2 attacker resources. The utilities are as follows:
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 t1 [P] t2[P] t3[NA] t4[U]  t1[P] t2[A] t3[NA] t4[U]  t1[P] t2[A] t3[A] t4[U]  t1[P] t2[A] t3[A] t4[NA] 
dti 0 0 0 0  0 1/3 0 0  0 1/3 0 0  0 2/3 1/3 0 
ati 1 1 0 0  1 1 0 0  1 3/5 2/5 0  1 3/5 2/5 0 
ua(ti,c) 5 4 3 2  5 3 3 2  5 3 3 2  5 2 2 2 
υd(ti,a) 1 2 0 0  1 2 0 0  1 6/5 6/5 0  1 6/5 6/5 0 
 (a) Initialize. θd=2, θa=3  (b) IMOP. θd=2, θa=3  (c) MMNA. θd=6/5, θa=3  (d) IMOA. θd=6/5, θa=2 
 
 t1[P] t2[A] t3[A] t4[NA]  t1[A] t2[A] t3[A] t4[NA]  t1[A] t2[A] t3[A] t4[P]  t1[A] t2[DS] t3[A] t4[P] 
dti 0 2/3 1/3 0  3/5 2/3 1/3 0  3/5 2/3 1/3 0  4/5 1 2/3 0 
ati 1 1/2 1/3 1/6  1 1/2 1/3 1/6  6/11 3/11 2/11 1  6/11 3/11 2/11 1 
ua(ti,c) 5 2 2 2  2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2  1 1 1 2 
υd(ti,a) 1 1 1 1/12  1 1 1 1/12  6/11 6/11 6/11 1/2  6/11 6/11 6/11 1/2 
 (e) MMNA. θd=1, θa=2  (f) IMOP. θd=1, θa=2  (g) MMNA. θd=6/11, θa=2  (h) IMOA. θd=6/11, θa=1 
 
 t1[A] t2[DS] t3[A] t4[P]  t1[A] t2[DS] t3[A] t4[A]  t1[A] t2[D] t3[A] t4[A]  t1 t2 t3 t4 
dti 4/5 1 2/3 0  4/5 1 2/3 1/2  4/5 1 2/3 1/2  ≈.806 1 ≈.677 ≈.516 
ati 1/2 1/3 1/6 1  1/2 1/3 1/6 1  3/10 1 1/10 3/5  3/10 1 1/10 3/5 
ua(ti,c) 1 1 1 2  1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1  ≈.968 1 ≈.968 ≈.968 
υd(ti,a) 1/2 2/3 1/2 1/2  1/2 2/3 1/2 1/2  3/10 2 3/10 3/10  3/10 2 3/10 3/10 
 (i) MMDS. θd=1/2, θa=1  (j) IMOP. θd=1/2, θa=1  (k) MMDS. θd=3/10, θa=1  (l) IMOA. θd=3/10, θa≈.968 
Figure 5.1: The example run of the algorithm. Each subfigure shows the current
equilibrium, threshold values, and target states at the end of the corresponding phase.
t1 t2 t3 t4
uua 5 4 3 2
uca 0 1 0 0
∆ud 1 2 3 .5
Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of equilibria for different amounts of defender resources
computed by the algorithm. We start with the equilibrium for 0 defender resources.
The attacker attacks the two targets that give him the highest utility, namely, t1 and
t2 (Fig. 5.1(a)). Since these two targets are attacked with probability 1, they are likely
to get defended as the number of defender resources increases. Thus, these targets
are both in the Pending (P) state. Target t4 is in the Untouched (U) state, because
uapt4q   θa, and thus it is neither attacked nor defended.
Increase Defender Mass on Pending (IMOP) phase: We increase the number of
defender resources and allocate them to the Pending target t2, which is currently the
most appealing to the defender. We cannot put more than 1{3 defender probability
on t2 without breaking the attacker’s equilibrium condition, so the phase ends at
that point. The new equilibrium strategies and updated target states are shown in
Figure 5.1(b).
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Move Attacker Mass to Newly Attacked (MMNA) phase: At the beginning of
this phase, target t2 is in the Active (A) state, because both players’ utilities for
defending/attacking this targets are at the corresponding threshold values. Target t3
is in the Newly Attacked (NA) state, because it is currently at the attacker threshold
and would start to be attacked if the defender put more probability on t2. In this
phase, we move 2{5 of the attacker’s probability mass from t2 to t3. As a result, both
t2 and t3 now have the highest marginal defender utility (Fig. 5.1(c)).
Increase Defender Mass on Active (IMOA) phase: We increase the defender prob-
ability on Active targets t2 and t3. Since ∆uapt2q  ∆uapt3q, we have to add the same
amount of probability to each of these targets; otherwise, the attacker’s best-response
condition would be broken. We can add up to 1{3 defender probability to these targets,
until the attacker’s utility for attacking t4 becomes equal to the utility for attacking
t2 and t3 (Fig. 5.1(d)).
MMNA phase: We now move attacker mass from Active targets t2 and t3 to the
Newly Attacked t4. To maintain the defender’s best-response condition, we need to
take mass from t2 and t3 proportionally to 1{∆udptq. We stop when the defender
becomes indifferent between t2, t3, and the Pending target t1 (Fig. 5.1(e)).
IMOP phase: We add 3{5 defender mass to t1, after which the attacker becomes
indifferent between all targets (Fig. 5.1(f)).
MMNA phase: The defender cannot add any mass to her optimal targets t1,
t2, and t3, because that would make t4 strictly preferred for the attacker, and the
attacker’s best-response condition would be broken. Therefore, we move attacker
mass from t1, t2, t3 to t4 in the right proportions, until the probability on t4 reaches 1
(Fig. 5.1(g)).
IMOA phase: We can now add defender mass to t1, t2, t3. That will make t4
strictly preferred for the attacker. However, as long as we add mass in the right pro-
portions, the attacker will still be best-responding, because t4 is attacked with probabil-
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MainRoutine 
Initialize 
Repeat: 
    If (no defender mass is left), return 
    UpdateTargetStates 
If (for all t, at > 0 implies dt = 1),  
    distribute the remaining defender  
    resources arbitrarily and return 
Else if (exists t in P s.t. υd(t, at) = θd), IMOP 
Else if (              ), IMOA 
Else if (        ), MMNA 
Else if (         ), MMDS 
Else  DDT 
 
Initialize 
Order the targets by decreasing   
    ,  
            breaking ties arbitrarily 
     for the first na targets;      for the rest 
     
           
                                    
           
      
 
            
UpdateTargetStates 
                                        
                                   
                                        
                                              
                                         
                                         
                                        
 
IMOP (Increase Defender Mass on Pending) 
Choose      s.t.     
         
Increase dt* until one of the following: 
  (1) ua(t*, dt* ) = θa 
  (2) dt* = 1 
  (3) No defender mass is left 
 
IMOA (Increase Defender Mass on Active) 
Simultaneously for all    , increase dt, and decrease 
θa, at relative rates that maintain  
ua(t, dt) = θa for all t in A, until one of the following: 
  (1) For some    ,   
        
  (2) For some    ,      
  (3) No defender mass is left 
MMNA (Move Attacker Mass to NA) 
Choose                       
Simultaneously move attacker mass from 
all     to t*, and decrease θd, at relative 
rates that maintain υd(t, at) = θd for all    , 
until one of the following: 
  (1) For some    , υd(t, at) = θd 
  (2) υd(t*, at* ) = θd 
  (3) at* = 1 
 
MMDS (Move Attacker Mass to DS) 
Choose       
Simultaneously move attacker mass from 
all     to t*, and decrease θd, at relative 
rates that maintain υd(t, at) = θd for all    , 
until one of the following: 
  (1) For some    , υd(t, at) = θd 
  (2) For some (in fact, all)    , at = 0 
  (3) at* = 1 
 
DDT (Decrease the Defender’s Threshold) 
Decrease θd until    
                         
Figure 5.2: The algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium.
ity 1. We stop when the defender probability on t2 becomes 1 and target t2 transitions
to the Defender Saturated (DS) phase (Fig. 5.1(h)).
Move Attacker Mass to Defender Saturated (MMDS) phase: We move attacker
mass from t1 and t3 to t2. This does not violate the defender’s best-response condition
because t2 is already fully defended. We stop when the defender becomes indifferent
between t1, t3, and t4 (Fig. 5.1(i)).
IMOP phase: We increase the defender mass on t4, until the attacker becomes
indifferent between all targets (Fig. 5.1(j)).
MMDS phase: We move attacker mass from Active targets t1, t3, t4 to DS target t2
in the proportions that keep the defender indifferent between the three Active targets,
until t2 becomes attacked with probability 1 (Fig. 5.1(k)).
IMOA phase: We add defender mass to t1, t3, t4, until all defender mass is al-
located. After the end of this phase, the algorithm terminates, and the resulting
equilibrium profile is an equilibrium of the game with 3 defender resources and 2
attacker resources (Fig. 5.1(l)).
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5.2.2 Algorithm, Correctness, Runtime
We present the pseudocode for the algorithm in Figure 5.2. The pseudocode contains
the exact definitions of the target states. For proof convenience, we will split the
Pending target state into two states: P1  tt P P : υdpt, saptqq   θdu, P2  tt P P :
υdpt, saptqq  θdu.
Theorem 10. Throughout the algorithm, the following holds.
• UpdateTargetStates always assigns each target to exactly one of the states
U,A, P1, P2, NA,DS,D.
• At the end of each phase, if the algorithm does not terminate, then at least one
target changes its state.
• Each phase terminates.
Proof sketch. It follows from the state definitions that no target can be in two states
at the same time. To prove the theorem, we will first show that each target is
assigned a state after the initialization phase, and then we will show which targets
change states at the end of each phase.
At the beginning of the algorithm, each target is assigned to exactly one state.
The na targets for which saptq  1 are assigned to the P state, except that targets
with saptq  1, u
u
aptq  θa, if any, are assigned to the A state. The other |T |  na
targets are assigned to the U state, except that targets with saptq  0, u
u
aptq  θa, if
any, are assigned to the NA state.
Next, we specify all target state changes for each phase and for each termination
criterion within each phase.
Next, for each phase, we list, for every termination criterion of that phase, which
targets change states (always a nonempty set, unless the algorithm terminates). It
is straightforward to check that one of these criteria will always apply.
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IMOP phase: (1) t becomes A. (2) t becomes D. (3) The algorithm terminates.
IMOA: (1) Every t P U s.t. uuaptq  θa becomes A. (2) Every t P A s.t. sdptq  1
becomes either DS (if saptq   1) or D (if saptq  1). (3) The algorithm terminates.
MMNA: (1) Every t P P s.t. υdpt, saptqq  θd transitions from P1 to P2. (2) Every
t P NA s.t. υdpt, saptqq  θd becomes A. (3) t
 transitions from NA to P1.
MMDS: (1) Every t P P s.t. υdpt, saptqq  θd transitions from P1 to P2. (2) If
this condition happens, then θd  0, thus saptq  0 for all t P P . Also, saptq  0 for
all t P A, and NA is empty. The algorithm will terminate after this phase because
saptq ¡ 0 implies sdptq  1. (3) t
 transitions to D.
DDT: Every t P NA s.t. υdpt, saptqq  θd transitions to A. Every t P P s.t. υdpt, saptqq 
θd transitions from P1 to P2.
To complete the proof, we also need to show that no target can change state
before the phase is over. This can be done in a straightforward way by carefully
checking all state definitions.
Theorem 11. Throughout the algorithm, the current strategies xsd, say constitute a
Nash equilibrium for the current number of defender resources.
Proof. This follows immediately from the following facts: (1) each target is always
in one of the states (Theorem 10), and (2) each state definition implies that the
equilibrium condition with respect to the thresholds (beginning of Section 5.2) is
satisfied for such a state.
Theorem 12. The algorithm terminates after at most 6|T | phases, and each phase
requires Op|T |q time.
Proof. We can order the 7 possible states as follows: U   NA   P1   P2   A  
DS   D. As we can see from the proof of Theorem 10, after each phase (except
the last one), some target changes its state to a later state. Thus the algorithm
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terminates after at most 6|T | phases. In each phase, we can calculate directly at
what point the phase will terminate, though this in general requires examining all
|T | targets.
5.2.3 Interchangeability
While we have shown how to compute a Nash equilibrium efficiently, a defender may
still be unconvinced about whether she actually wants to play her corresponding
strategy. For example, if she has a commitment advantage where the attacker ob-
serves her distribution before acting, she would prefer to play a Stackelberg strategy;
we will return to this in Section 5.3. However, even if the attacker cannot observe
her distribution, she may worry that she is playing her strategy from the “wrong”
equilibrium: in general games, if one player plays according to one equilibrium and
the other according to another, the result may be disastrous for both (see the game
of chicken). In this section, we alleviate this latter concern, by showing that the
security games in this chapter satisfy the interchange property: any combination of
equilibrium strategies is, in fact, itself an equilibrium. (This was previously shown
for a large class of security games with a single attacker resource (Korzhyk et al.,
2011).)
Suppose σ  xsd, say and σ
1  xs1d, s
1
ay are two NE profiles in a security game
with multiple attacker resources. We need to show that xs1d, say and xsd, s
1
ay are also
NE profiles of the same game. We first prove that for any target, either the defender
probability on that target is the same in all equilibrium profiles, or the attacker
probability is the same in all equilibrium profiles, or both.
Lemma 13. If σ  xsd, say and σ
1  xs1d, s
1
ay are two NE profiles, then there is no
target t for which both (1) the defender probabilities are different in the two profiles
and (2) the attacker probabilities are different in the two profiles. In other words, for
any target t, at least one of equalities sdptq  sdptq
1, saptq  s
1
aptq must hold.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is a target t for which
sdptq  sdptq
1 and saptq  s
1
aptq. We show that the following four cases must all hold
even though two are contradictory.
Case “”: There exists a target t1 such that sdpt1q
1   sdpt1q and s
1
apt1q  
sapt1q. In profile σ, the attacker’s utility uapt1, sdpt1qq must be greater than or equal
to the threshold value θa, because sapt1q ¡ 0. Similarly, in profile σ
1, the attacker’s
utility uapt1, sdpt1q
1qmust be less than or equal to the threshold θ1a, because s
1
apt1q   1.
At the same time, the attacker’s utility for attacking t1 is higher in profile σ
1 than in
profile σ, because sdpt1q
1   sdpt1q. Thus, the following three inequalities must hold.
θa ¤ uapt1, sdpt1qq
uapt1, sdpt1qq   uapt1, sdpt1q
1q
uapt1, sdpt1q
1q ¤ θ1a
It follows from these three inequalities that θ1a ¡ θa. Because
°
t saptq 
°
t s
1
aptq
and s1apt1q   sapt1q, there must exist a target t2 such that s
1
apt2q ¡ sapt2q. Since
s1apt2q ¡ 0, it must be the case that uapt2, s
1
dpt2qq ¥ θ
1
a. Similarly, because sapt2q   1,
it must be the case that uapt2, dt2q ¤ θa. Using the last two inequalities and the fact
that θ1a ¡ θa, it follows that uapt2, dt2q   uapt2, s
1
dpt2qq, which implies s
1
dpt2q   dt2 .
By considering the target t2, it follows that the case “ ” must also hold.
Case “ ”: There is a target t1 such that s
1
dpt1q   sdpt1q and s
1
apt1q ¡ sapt1q.
The defender’s marginal utility for defending target t1 must be at or above the
threshold θd in profile σ (because sdpt1q ¡ 0) and at or below the threshold θ
1
d in
profile σ1 (because s1dpt1q   1). At the same time, since t1 is attacked with a higher
probability in σ1 than in σ, it must be that υdpt1, s
1
apt1qq ¡ υdpt1, sapt1qq. Thus we
have θ1d ¥ υdpt1, s
1
apt1qq ¡ υdpt1, sapt1qq ¥ θd. Because
°
t sdptq 
°
t sdptq
1  nd and
s1dpt1q   sdpt1q, there must be a target t2 such that s
1
dpt2q ¡ dt2 . The defender’s
marginal utility for defending t2 must be at or above the threshold θ
1
d in profile σ
1
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(because s1dpt2q ¡ 0) and at or below the threshold θd in profile σ (because dt2   1).
Since θ1d ¡ θd, it follows that υpt2, s
1
apt2qq ¥ θ
1
d ¡ θd ¥ υpt2, sapt2qq, which implies
s1apt2q ¡ sapt2q. By considering the target t2, it follows that the case “  ” must also
hold.
We can also prove the following two implications similarly to the two cases de-
scribed above, by reversing the roles of equilibria σ and σ1:
Case “  ”: There is a target t1 such that s
1
dpt1q ¡ sdpt1q and s
1
apt1q ¡ sapt1q.
If this case holds, then the case “ ” must also hold. This can be proven similarly
to the implication “” ñ “ ”, by reversing the roles of equilibria σ and σ1.
Case “ ”: There is a target t1 such that s
1
dpt1q ¡ sdpt1q and s
1
apt1q   sapt1q.
If this case holds, then the case “” must also hold. This can be proven similarly
to the implication “ ” ñ “  ”, by reversing the roles of equilibria σ and σ1.
It follows that if at least one of the cases “”, “ ”, “  ”, “ ” holds, then
all of them must hold. But if both “” and “  ” hold, then both inequalities
θ1a ¡ θa and θa ¡ θ
1
a must hold, which is impossible. Hence, none of the four cases
can hold.
We now show that in an equilibrium the defender obtains the same marginal
utility from all targets that have different defender probabilities in a different equi-
librium.
Lemma 14. Suppose that σ and σ1 are two NE profiles, and t1, t2 are two targets
such that sdpt1q  s
1
dpt1q and dt2  s
1
dpt2q. Then υdpt1, sapt1qq  υdpt2, sapt2qq 
υdpt1, s
1
apt1qq  υdpt2, s
1
apt2qq.
Proof. Because
°
t sdptq 
°
t sdptq
1  nd, it is enough to show that υdpt1, sapt1qq 
υdpt2, sapt2qq holds for any pair of targets t1, t2 such that sdpt1q   s
1
dpt1q and dt2 ¡
s1dpt2q. (This is because if (say) sdpt1q   s
1
dpt1q and dt2   s
1
dpt2q, there must ex-
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ist a third target t3 with dt3 ¡ d
1
t3
, so that we can then conclude υdpt1, sapt1qq 
υdpt3, at3q  υdpt2, sapt2qq.)
In profile σ, the defender can shift her probability from t2 to t1, because dt2 ¡ 0
and sdpt1q   1. Since σ is an equilibrium profile, the defender must not benefit
from such a shift of probability. Thus υdpt1, sapt1qq ¤ υdpt2, sapt2qq. Using a similar
argument for profile σ1, we get υdpt1, s
1
apt1qq ¥ υdpt2, s
1
apt2qq. It also follows from
Lemma 13 that sapt1q  s
1
apt1q and sapt2q  s
1
apt2q. Hence, we have υdpt1, sapt1qq ¤
υdpt2, sapt2qq  υdpt2, s
1
apt2qq ¤ υdpt1, s
1
apt1qq  υdpt1, sapt1qq, so it follows that these
four quantities are all the same.
In the following lemma, we show that any defender’s NE strategy is a best-
response to any attacker’s NE strategy.
Lemma 15. If σ  xsd, say and σ
1  xs1d, s
1
ay are two NE profiles, then s
1
d is a
best-response to sa.
Proof. We will show that the defender’s utility for playing strategy s1d against sa
is the same as the defender’s utility for playing sd against sa. First, note that
udps
1
d, saq  udpsd, saq 
°
t:sdptq1sdptq
rsdptq
1  sdptqs υdpt, saptqq. Consider any target
t such that dt  d
1
t . Using Lemma 14, we can rewrite the difference in the utilities
as follows: udps
1
d, saq  udpsd, saq  υdpt1, sapt1qq
°
t:s1dptqsdptq
rs1dptq  sdptqs  0. The
last summation is equal to zero because
°
t sdptq 
°
t s
1
dptq.
The following lemma can be proven similarly to Lemma 15, by switching from
the defender’s to the attacker’s perspective.
Lemma 16. If σ  xsd, say and σ
1  xs1d, s
1
ay are two NE profiles, then s
1
a is a
best-response to sd.
The interchange property follows from Lemmas 15 and 16.
74
 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 100 200 300
ti
m
e 
(s
)
|T|
Figure 5.3: Solid lines: time to compute NE as a function of |T |, for na  nd 
10, . . . , 70. Dashed line: time to compute the normal-form of the game with na 
nd  10.
Theorem 17. If σ  xsd, say and σ
1  xs1d, s
1
ay are two NE profiles in a security
game with multiple attacker resources, then xs1d, say and xsd, s
1
ay are also NE profiles
in that game.
5.2.4 Experimental Results
We now show experimental results for our implementation of the algorithm (Fig-
ure 5.3). For given |T |, nd, na, we randomly draw u
u
a and u
c
d from t1, . . . , 100u, and
then we randomly draw uca from t0, . . . , u
u
a  1u and u
u
d from t0, . . . , u
c
d  1u. Each
data point averages over 20 games. As a sanity check, our implementation verified
that the strategies computed for each game did constitute a Nash equilibrium. The
quadratic runtime of the algorithm is reflected in the experimental results. We note
that the numbers of pure strategies for the players are
 
|T |
nd

and
 
|T |
na

, so any alterna-
tive algorithm that is based on writing out the normal form is doomed to exponential
space (and hence, time) requirements. The time to compute the
 
|T |
nd


 
|T |
na

utility
matrix of the normal-form game for nd  na  10 is shown in Figure 5.3 with a
dashed line. We can see that our algorithm scales well in the number of targets and
attacker resources.
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5.3 NP-Hardness of Computing Stackelberg Strategies
We now turn to the problem of computing a defender Stackelberg strategy. Consider
the following theorem.
Theorem 18. In security games with multiple attacker resources, finding an optimal
defender Stackelberg strategy is weakly NP-hard. This holds even when the defender
has only one resource, and the defender’s utility for a target does not depend on
whether she has a resource there (that is, ucdptq  u
u
dptq for all t).
1
Proof sketch. We reduce an arbitrary knapsack problem instance—given by k items,
where each item j is defined by a pair pwj, vjq, and we are asked if there is a subset
S of the items with
°
jPS wj ¤ 1 and
°
jPS vj ¥ V—to the following game. We
construct a game with 2k targets, in which the defender has one resource and the
attacker has k resources. Targets t1, . . . , tk correspond to the items in the knapsack,
and the utilities are set up as follows for 1 ¤ i ¤ k.
uuaptiq  wi
ucaptiq  wi  1
ucdptiq  u
u
dptiq  vi
Targets tk 1, . . . , t2k are “dummy” targets, so that for k   1 ¤ i ¤ 2k: u
u
aptiq 
ucaptiq  u
c
dptiq  u
u
dptiq  0.
Let the vector sd represent the defender’s strategy, so that sdptiq is the probability
of target ti being covered. If sdptiq ¥ wi for 1 ¤ i ¤ k, the attacker attacks a dummy
target instead of ti, thus increasing the defender’s utility by vi.
There exists an attacker pure-strategy best-response to the defender’s Stackelberg
strategy (with ties broken in the defender’s favor) such that the optimal subset S of
1 We have also found a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm (not presented here) for the special case
where ucdptq  u
u
dptq for all t. Note that this violates the assumption that u
c
dptq ¡ u
u
dptq. It is easy
to modify the utilities by  so that this property holds again and the reduction still works.
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the items in the knapsack corresponds to the targets ti with 1 ¤ i ¤ k and ati  0.
It can be shown that the defender can get a utility of at least V 
°k
i1 vi if and only
if the knapsack instance has a solution (with value at least V ).
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6Directions for Future Research
There are a number of directions for future research on the topics discussed in Chap-
ters 2-5.
Regarding the computation of an optimal correlated strategy to commit to, one
direction is to try to extend the methodology to game representations other than the
normal form. Significant results on the efficient computation of correlated equilibria
in succinctly represented games have been obtained, though optimizing over the
space of correlated equilibria (which is close to what we do in this thesis) poses more
challenges (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2013).
In security games, an important direction for future research is to address the
cases in which computing a Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard. Can we find algorithms
that, although they require exponential time in the worst case, solve typical instances
fast? Can we identify additional restrictions on the game so that the problem be-
comes polynomial-time solvable (Letchford and Conitzer, 2013)? Are there good
polynomial-time approximation algorithms, or anytime algorithms that find a rea-
sonably good solution fast (Jain et al., 2013)? Another direction for future research
is to consider security games with incomplete information (Bayesian games) or mul-
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tiple time periods (extensive-form of stochastic games). In unrestricted games, these
aspects can lead to additional complexity (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; von Sten-
gel and Zamir, 2010; Letchford et al., 2009; Letchford and Conitzer, 2010; Letchford
et al., 2012).
As for security games with multiple attacker resources, one natural question is
whether the algorithm that we presented in this thesis can be generalized to richer
settings. For example, is it possible to compute Nash equilibria efficiently in cases
where either defender resources or attacker resources (or both) are heterogeneous?
Can we efficiently compute them in (restricted) settings with schedules?
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